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This research proposes a holistic framework to help understand and mitigate the interrelated and 
successive conflicts that occur over water resources in the Great Lakes and the rivers flowing 
into them. Local Canadian governments, in addition to many public and private companies, are 
heavy water consumers, who extract vast amounts of water from water sources such as the Great 
Lakes. Moreover, temperature changes, and increasing storm water in the past few decades, 
added to pollutants such as phosphorous pouring into the Great Lakes from various origins, place 
more pressure on these valuable, yet vulnerable water sources. Various NGOs and the states and 
provinces surrounding the Great Lakes strive to protect the Great Lakes from excessive water 
extractions and pollutants. The different priorities of the aforementioned stakeholders have 
become sources of various disputes. 
Traditional conflict resolution publications tend to focus on investigating each of the conflicts 
independently from the other disputes existing among the stakeholders. However, a holistic view 
is required to understand the conflicts, acknowledging the previous disputes, which have 
transpired in the past when analyzing each conflict. This broader perspective approach presents a 
better ability to study potential future conflicts, since it enhances the predictability of the 
scenarios, which might occur later during other disputes.  
In the first step, after identifying the relevant stakeholders associated with the Great Lakes, 
conflicts among them are analyzed using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) 
approach. However, the input for each conflict's GMCR model is highly influenced by the 
previous conflicts' outputs. Modeling and analyzing this influence are accomplished through 
intricately assessing the results of the previous conflicts' GMCRs and linking them to the 





In the next step, major external variables that affect the current steady-state system are 
investigated. Political happenings, economic factors, social trends, technological advances, legal 
changes, and environmental crises are some of the key variables that are investigated. Then, 
several scenarios based on this external analysis of the system are proposed and utilized for 
enhancing future decision-making.  
The aforementioned steps are showcased using three case studies of disputes among the Great 
Lakes stakeholders. The main studied case is the Lake Erie pollution conflict which is 
investigated in two instances of 1970s and 2010s. It is concluded in this thesis that if the 1970s 
dispute had been investigated using the causal loops, GMCR, external analysis, and scenario 
analysis, the stakeholders, especially local authorities in the Lake Erie watershed, would have 
been able to make better decisions in the more recent dispute in 2010s.  
This research with the current holistic framework should also enhance understanding of the 
interrelated conflicts over essential topics such as financial, health, and environmental concerns 
caused by pollution (specifically algae blooms) in the Great Lakes and the rivers flowing into 
them. The developed understanding, in addition to the results of the conducted external analysis, 
should help decisionmakers, especially water utility providers, who carry a huge responsibility 
towards millions of water users, predict and prevent potential water disputes with other 
stakeholders. Although the case studies in this research focus on the Great Lakes and their 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1. Background and Motivation 
The North American Great Lakes (mentioned as Great Lakes hereinafter) are critical to Canada 
and the US as they are a drinking water source for more than 33 million Canadians (from eight of 
Canada's 20 largest cities) and Americans (Mehta 2016). However, various threats such as 
increased local population in the Great Lakes watersheds leading to more local water usage 
(Matheny 2017), toxins, invasive species, and other pollution accumulating in the Great Lakes 
(e.g. 22 million pounds of plastic garbage each year) (Zukowski 2016), and also climate change 
which is warming the waters (NOAA 2016), threaten this world's largest source of surface 
freshwater. Another threat is the need for water extraction from the Great Lakes to US and 
Canadian cities outside of the Great Lakes watershed. For example, the city of Waukesha in 
Wisconsin has fought hard to pipe water from Lake Michigan, due to its currently radium 
contaminated water wells (Mehta 2016). Also, the increased water demand in other parts of the 
world other than the US and Canada which imposes pressures on Canada and US to export water 
from this freshwater source, is yet another threat affecting the Great Lakes from a global 
perspective. 
These threats have been a major incentive for funding such as the Great Lakes Restoration 
Initiative (GLRI) (Great Lakes Restoration Initiative, 2020) and joint initiatives such as the Great 
Lakes - St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement (a pact bringing 
together eight states from the US, and two Canadian provinces adjoining the Great Lakes and St. 





and Premiers, 2005). These supportive initiatives have contributed to protecting the Great Lakes 
from the damaging effects of external threats (Saeger, 2007).  
All of these factors (i.e. threats on one side and supporting initiatives on the other), and the 
associated conflicts among the stakeholders who have a stake in the Great Lakes, have together 
formed a complex dynamic system which should be investigated through a holistic perspective. 
In this research, a broader framework for investigating this complex system is developed.  
Moreover, with the management of natural resources being a provincial responsibility (Section 
92A of the Constitution Act), and the Canadian federal government having authority over topics 
such as trade, commerce, and inland fisheries, municipalities including local utility managers 
have been put in a fragile position regarding the ability to deal with concerns and conflicts 
regarding their water supply systems (Ronan, 2016). This brings about a knowledge gap which 
needs to be filled; to provide clearer perspectives to these local authorities for better handling of 
water management conflicts.  
This thesis attempts to answer the following research questions: 
- What are the main water related conflicts surrounding the Great Lakes?  
- Which decisionmakers are involved in the conflicts associated with the Great Lakes? 
- What are the current situations of each of these stakeholders? (Note: the word 
“stakeholders” is used interchangeably with “decisionmakers” and refers to individuals or 
institutions who affect, or are affected by, the Great Lakes). 
- How do these stakeholders interact in the real world? Or, in other words, why are they in 





- How could we help resolve the multiple conflicts among these stakeholders in a 
systematic and sustainable way? And, which method(s) can contribute to achieving this?  
- How can studying previous conflicts among the stakeholders help in understanding the 
current and potential future conflicts among them? Through which approach can this be 
done?  
- How do external factors affect the current states of each of the stakeholders and also, the 
existing disputes among them?  
- How do each of the stakeholders, especially local municipalities including Cities and 
Regional Municipalities, and also the Great Lakes as a valuable water resource, benefit 
from such a research?  
1.2. Research Goal and Objectives 
The main goal of the current study is to propose a framework for thoroughly studying complex 
water resource conflicts associated with the Great Lakes watershed. This necessitates some 
objectives to be met: 
1- Investigating existing conflicts in the states, provinces, regions, and cities, surrounding 
the Great Lakes.   
2- Identifying the involved decisionmakers in the conflicts related to the Great Lakes.  
3- Studying these stakeholders’ preferences in the different ongoing conflicts.  
4- Developing a set of options for each of these stakeholders based on primary and 
secondary data collected throughout the research.  
5- Analyzing different possible outcomes of the interactions among the stakeholders using 
the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) method (Fang, Hipel, & Kilgour, 





various conflicts among the stakeholders as a whole, instead of investigating them 
independent from each other. 
6- Shedding light on the external variables, which are not controllable by the stakeholders. 
These external factors hugely affect the status and potential conflicts among the 
decisionmakers.  
7- Outline different scenarios developed based on the occurrence of shocks related to the 
external variables. 
1.3. Research Methodology  
This thesis includes four phases. The first phase (Chapters 1 and 2) focuses on identifying and 
clarifying the problem at hand and the previously mentioned research questions. The literature on 
the Great Lakes water conflicts is discussed in depth, outlining some of the conflicts currently 
affecting the stakeholders. It is also in this section that the knowledge gap is identified. This is 
crucial to the research since it brings all there is to bear on the complex situation of interest.  
In the second phase (Chapter 3), methodologies to model and analyze the current thesis data are 
investigated. These methods include the Causal Loop step of the System Dynamics approach, 
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), External Analysis, and Scenario Analysis. The 
Causal Loops approach provides an initial broad perspective into the dynamics of each of the 
conflicts. The GMCR approach is used to delve deeper into the stakeholders’ status, preferences, 
and also the relationships among involved decisionmakers. External Analysis investigates the 
environment in which the conflict is taking place in. This step, added to Scenario Analysis, helps 
to study different possible outcomes of the conflict in the future. This is to aid in enhanced 





The information gathering in the first and second phases happened through primary and 
secondary data collection from various sources. In the primary data collection, various 
individuals were interviewed to gather different perspectives on the stakeholders’ views and the 
ongoing conflicts among them. The details of the interview processes are discussed in the 
upcoming sections. Secondary data collection was conducted through reviewing hundreds of 
articles, journal papers, governmental and private websites, and news sources.  
The third phase focuses on using the previously discussed methods to categorize independent 
and interrelated conflicts and, to develop insights and solutions for those disputes. Three case 
studies are selected and investigated through the methodologies discussed in Phase II. Validation 
involves stability and sensitivity analyses as well as functional demonstration and stakeholder 
evaluation. And finally, the fourth phase of the research is a broad overview of the contributions, 
proposed future studies, and limitations of the research.  
Although the focus of this thesis is on the Great Lakes and the states, provinces, regions, and 
cities surrounding them, it attempts to develop a broader framework for systematically 
investigating water related conflicts. In other words, the cases studied in different sections of the 
thesis, are all linked to the Great Lakes, however, the procedures and methodology used, can be 
implemented in other geographical contexts and disputes other than Great Lakes conflicts as 
well.  
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
After the current introduction chapter (Chapter 1), in Chapter 2, a literature review on the Great 
Lakes and its stakeholders and major conflicts is provided. It is in this chapter that the different 





through this research is also outlined. Then, in Chapter 3, the methodology of analyzing the 
conflicts is discussed. The results of investigating the chosen cases through system dynamics 
causal loops and GMCR are described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 covers a case using causal loops, 
GMCR, external analysis, and scenario analysis to showcase the proposed perspective in this 
thesis. And finally, Chapter 6, focuses on the conclusions of the research and the discussions 
regarding the conflict. Limitations and future research is also discussed in this final chapter. The 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1. Global Water Crises   
More than 2.2 billion people throughout the globe, lack access to safely managed drinking water 
(WHO/UNICEF, 2019). This not only affects their physical health, but also indirectly influences 
their mental health, education levels, employment, and other aspects of their lives (Vidal, 
Harrington & Fisher, 2014). For example, in many developing nations women have to walk long 
distances to reach water, and this prevents them from spending time on school or work (Molle 
and Mollinga, 2003). Drinking water scarcity puts people in a poverty cycle, making it difficult 
for them to care for other important aspects of life (GWTF, 2006). These destructive cycles 
negatively affect people, and in turn, their families, their villages, and their countries as a whole 
(Molle and Mollinga, 2003).  
People are dependent on water sources for their basic drinking needs. Water access is also a 
necessity for agricultural, manufacturing, industrial growth, power generation (through water 
dams), job creation, and overall economic development (EU, 2019).  
About 260 rivers are currently flowing through more than one country around the globe. And the 
water in these rivers, must be shared among millions of people (Postel, 2000). Thus, each of 
these shared rivers is a potential ground for instability or dispute among different decisionmakers 
(Petersen-Perlman, Veilleux, & Wolf, 2017). Therefore, effective shared water resources 
management requires creative approaches to ensure win-win resolutions among various involved 





2.2. Great Lakes  
The Great Lakes are among the internationally shared rivers and lakes in the world. Unique 
aspects make this shared water resource interesting and challenging to investigate. Firstly, 20% 
of the globe’s fresh water exists in these lakes. This brings in various opportunities for the 
neighboring provinces and cities, yet presents its own challenges as well (Becker and Easter, 
1999). One of the unique challenges would be the increasing interest in other water-depleted 
nations to access the Great Lakes (e.g. through importing water from Canada or US).  
Secondly, the Great Lakes are surrounded by two of the most powerful and influential countries 
in the world, the US and Canada (Becker and Easter, 1999). Therefore, the actions that these two 
countries take would be considered intricately by other countries around the world. The approach 
these governments or related decisionmakers seek to solve their conflicts might turn into action 
models for others, and thus, it is necessary to act as wisely as possible to avoid major global 
conflicts as well. Standardized conflict resolution frameworks can be developed by these 
influential countries to guide the resolving of similar conflicts worldwide.  
The third unique aspect of the Great Lakes is that they are surrounded by eight states from the 
US, two Canadian Provinces, tens of municipalities, commercial companies, and environmental 
NGOs, and millions of people (Dagenais and Cruikshank, 2016). This high number of decision-
making authorities and other types of influential decisionmakers substantially increase 
controversial preferences and thus, disputes regarding topics related to the Great Lakes (Figure 
2.1 depicts a map of the Great Lakes surrounded by states from the US, Canadian provinces, and 






Figure 2-1: The Great Lakes and the Surrounding States and Provinces (Wikimedia Commons, 
2018) 
All of these unique aspects regarding the Great Lakes necessitate a thorough understanding of 
this valuable water resource. To develop such an understanding, the first step is to study the 
governmental institutions, companies, and other decisionmakers associated with the Great Lakes. 
This ensures that we understand their preferences and stakes in the Great Lakes, which in turn, 
helps us better analyze their associated conflicts.  
2.3. The Great Lakes Stakeholders 
2.3.1. Residents of Great Lakes Watersheds 
Residents of Great Lakes watersheds in general are the initial stakeholders of the Great Lakes 





on the Great Lakes, which are providing them with fresh drinking water, in addition to their 
water supply for other uses. Moreover, any water saving initiative, or search and development of 
other water sources infrastructure, would also benefit or harm this important stakeholder 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017). 
2.3.2 Canadian and US Federal, and Provincial and State-wide Governments 
Canadian and US Federal governments, in addition to the Great Lakes’ neighboring Provincial 
and State-wide governments are major stakeholders regarding the Great Lakes. Their 
responsibility towards maintaining the Great Lakes, substantially increases their involvement 
with the Great Lakes’ water management initiatives (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 
2017). They have power over regulating water extraction, treatment of waters entering and 
exiting the Great Lakes, or other activities that affect these major water sources in any way. One 
of the other influences they have is the money they can allocate towards the Great Lakes’ 
restoration. Overall, they are considered extremely influential stakeholders with high bargaining 
power because of their authority over regulations and budgets.  
2.3.3. Cities, and Regions Surrounding the Great Lakes 
Cities and Regions are in an interesting situation since they have some authority over policy 
making at the local level and also have limited budget allocation. However, they also have 
responsibilities over the implementation of policies (sewage or drinking water treatment 
standards) set by higher regulating authorities such as provincial or federal level governments. 
Moreover, they are responsible for interacting with each other as well, since many of the 
Provincial or even local initiatives, require multiple cities to cooperate closely to implement 
projects (anonymous interviewee #4, personal communication, 2020). This complicates the 





the same time, they must answer to higher authorities and other municipalities regarding their 
responsibilities on conducting initiatives (Ronan, 2016).  
The more complex cases are the Cities or Regions which are in the Great Lakes watershed, but at 
the same time, are not a riparian zone to the Great Lakes. For example, Waterloo, a Southern 
Ontario city, is in Lake Erie’s watershed, however, it is landlocked, and it supplies its water 
needs from groundwater and Grand River (which flows into Lake Erie after passing through the 
City of Waterloo). This hugely increases the authorities’ anxiety to sufficiently provide water for 
the growing population of the City (anonymous interviewee #1, personal communication, 2020).  
2.3.4. Agricultural Water Users 
With climate change, agricultural practices are being placed under the spotlight by different 
decisionmakers (e.g. NGOs, community activists, and governments) to become more effective in 
decreasing the amount of water used, and also in lessening their negative effects on polluting the 
Great Lakes.  
Agricultural water use is one of the major consumers of water resources. For example, 
agricultural water usage accounted for about 20% of the total daily water consumption in Ontario 
in 2001 (De Loë, Kreutzwiser, & Ive 2001). Much of the agricultural water usage in Ontario 
occurs in Southern Ontario for livestock watering, fruits and vegetables growing, and also 
irrigation. Since water demand is already very high in Southern Ontario and also since 
agricultural water usages, especially the irrigation sub-category, are usually seasonal, it is 
important to understand how these water drawings affect or impose pressures on the Great Lakes 
in different times of the year. Another major concern with these stakeholders is their use of 





in turn increases algal blooms (Shin, 2013). Negative effects of algal blooms are discussed 
further in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.  
Variables such as climate change effects in recent years, which might change governmental 
regulations on water usage and agricultural fertilizer application, would most probably change 
this stakeholder’s status quo. 
2.3.5. Manufacturing Industries 
Surface freshwater resources such as rivers and lakes have been directly providing about 75% of 
the water used in manufacturing industries in Canada. Another 14% is supplied from utilities 
associated with public municipalities which also originally source their supplies from freshwater 
resources (Statistics Canada, 2009). In Canada’s manufacturing industries, most of the water 
usage is by paper manufacturing companies (46%), followed by metal industries (about 35%). 
Most of this freshwater usage by manufacturing industries has been occurring in Ontario (about 
45%) followed by Quebec (about 24%) and British Columbia (about 17%). Some of this water is 
discharged (about 3500 million cubic meters per year), and most of it (about 75%) is returned 
back into freshwater sources. However, more than 38% of the discharged water is not treated in 
any capacity, before flowing back into surface freshwater bodies (Statistics Canada, 2009).  
2.3.6. Water Bottling Companies  
The bottled water business has been expanding over the recent years. The industry was valued at 
185 billion USD in 2015, and is expected to grow to 334 billion USD by 2023 (Market Reports 
World, 2020). This business growth has sounded alarms for many stakeholders, introducing a 
potentially major conflict among the many decisionmakers in the water management field. Signs 





Nestle is pumping water from aquifers that feed Lake Michigan (in Mecosta County) (Goodman, 
2017) or is attempting to get into a long-term contract with the Ontario Provincial Government to 
buy a 110-meter deep well near the City of Guelph, Ontario, raised many speculations regarding 
the future of the Great Lakes and Southern Ontario’s drinking water sources.  
2.3.7. Fisheries 
Fisheries are one of the other stakeholders which are vulnerable to changes in the Great Lakes 
status. High levels of water usage by the other stakeholders, less sewage water treatment, more 
agricultural water runoffs, in addition to higher temperatures imposed by climate change effects, 
are all variables which put more pressure on the Great Lake’s system, which in turn, negatively 
affect fisheries’ businesses (Shin, 2013). Fisheries are usually strong supporters of imposing 
strict standards on water treatment, water usage, agricultural fertilizer application, or other 
limiting rules and regulations. 
2.3.8. NGOs 
NGOs are other stakeholders which affect and are affected by the Great Lakes. Some of these 
NGOs provide grants, share information, and offer training and consulting to businesses and 
other stakeholders of the Great Lakes (e.g. Freshwater Future Canada (2020) and Alliance for the 
Great Lakes (2020)). Some of these NGOs receive funding from governments and communities 
to run initiatives or programs to save more water (Government of Canada, 2015).  
Some other NGOs contribute to Great Lakes conservation through focusing on ensuring full 
implementation of local and international governmental acts and agreements relevant to the 





monitors and encourages government progress towards implementation of the Ontario’s Great 
Lakes Protection Act (Government of Canada, 2015).  
2.3.9. Developers and Contractors 
The other group of Great Lakes stakeholders affecting the dynamics of the water management 
system, are developers and contractors. Almost all water and wastewater infrastructure 
construction and maintenance projects, which should be approved by municipalities and other 
government bodies, are conducted by this group of stakeholders. Although a minimum quality 
and budget is usually assumed by the governmental bodies for implementing the projects, in 
many instances, the work done by the contractors sets the standard for governmental 
infrastructure budget approvals (anonymous interviewee #4, personal communication, 2020). 
Therefore, the contractors’ and developers’ decisions and actions play huge roles not only in 
required water and wastewater project budgets, but also in the quality of the conducted projects.  
2.4. The Great Lakes Conflicts  
2.4.1. Pollution of the Great Lakes 
The Great Lakes are a source of water for many commercial decisionmakers, and drinking water 
for millions of people and thus, the health of the Great Lakes is critical to many. However, 
population growth, climate change, revitalization in farming experiences, and many other 
variables have all contributed to a serious rise of different pollutants in the Great Lakes. In 
addition to point source and non-point source pollutants which affect the Great Lakes directly, 
rivers flowing into the Great Lakes are also a major source of pollution which have been focused 
on more recently regarding their effects on the quality of the Great Lakes’ waters. Phosphorous 





the Great Lakes (Government of Canada, 2018). It has been shown in a study from 2013 that 
Lake Erie was filled with about 72 metric tons of artificial sweeteners in 2013 (Spoelstra, Schiff 
& Brown, 2013). Lake Erie’s phosphorous levels were estimated to be 11,476 metric tons in 
2018 (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020). 
Many stakeholders play direct or indirect roles in increasing or decreasing pollutant levels in the 
Great Lakes. Agricultural and livestock farmers and industrial manufacturers are main 
contributors to increased phosphorous levels in the Great Lakes. However, governments (at all 
levels) are main contributors to phosphorous decreasing initiatives which aim to reduce the 
negative effects of pollutants in the Great Lakes (Government of Canada, 2018). Although, local 
governments such as municipalities are in charge of maintaining sewage systems and thus, are 
responsible for the phosphorous that flow into the Great Lakes from cities’ sewage systems. But 
again, these local governments are vulnerable to the negative consequences of high phosphorous 
levels in the Great Lakes. For example, algal blooms which are a consequence of high 
phosphorous levels, could clog intake pipes which are used for drinking water and other uses 
(Shin, 2013; TidesCanada, 2015).  
As discussed above, many stakeholders are involved with the Great Lakes’ pollution levels. 
Although some contribute to a higher quality water supply through investments and increased 
regulations, some other stakeholders, through the nature of their business or activities, increase 
pollutant levels in the Great Lakes. And some other, such as municipalities, have both positive 





2.4.2. Conflicts between Regional Governments and Local Municipalities 
In some of the Great Lakes watersheds, Regional governments are responsible for finding, 
maintaining and treating water sources for their regions. However, local municipalities in these 
regions deliver the retail water to final customers. They also have the responsibility of returning 
the used water to regional governments for treatment (Region of Waterloo, 2020a). Therefore, 
there is less incentive for these local municipalities to actively take part in water conservation 
initiatives, since they are not directly responsible for finding alternative water sources. And also 
that they do not have to spend more money if more water has been used, since treatment plants 
are owned and operated by the regional governments (anonymous interviewee #3, personal 
communication, 2020). Moreover, these local municipalities sell the water to the customers, 
generating revenues for their operations, and structure. This means that if they sell less, at the 
end of the day, they are making less money. This is yet another reason why they might not be so 
eager to take part in water efficiency programs, run by these Regional governments (anonymous 
interviewee #2, personal communication, 2020).  
The other concern is that water consumption metered data is either not error-free, not sent to the 
Regions in time, or not collected at the local municipalities’ level at all. The complexity of the 
billing system has also been mentioned as another issue, which makes understanding and 
analyzing the bills harder by the Regional Governments. 
Moreover, in some regions, water is sold to the local municipalities, at a lower price than the 
water sold to the final customers. For example, the Region of Waterloo sells water at a price of 
$1.0953 per cubic metre to the City of Waterloo, and the City, sells the water with a higher rate 





2020b). Although this price increase is mostly for the City to cover its distribution and billing 
costs, the amount of the price increase might raise a conflict between the two.    
Also, since the local municipalities are separate entities working with consumers, the Region 
might not have permission from the other entities to freely use the gathered water data, and this 
results in less clarity when analyzing and making decisions.  
Several other communications issues have also been happening which could result in conflicts 
between the Region and local municipalities. These communication issues have been occurring 
in instances of emergency, such as watermain breaks caused by construction projects 
(anonymous interviewee #5, personal communication, 2020). 
2.4.3. Conflicts among Neighboring Municipalities 
Water fights involving different cities surrounding the Great Lakes is one of the other seemingly 
unavoidable Great Lakes’ conflicts. For example, Waukesha, Wisconsin was faced with a 
shortage of fresh water in 2014 due to its own water sources being “contaminated with high 
levels of naturally occurring cancer-causing radium” (Mehta 2016). The Waukesha City asked 
for permission from the eight states surrounding the Great Lakes to pipe water from Lake 
Michigan as an alternate source of water. However, the City was faced with fierce opposition 
from many, including the Mayor of Thunder Bay, who was concerned about the Great Lake’s 
vulnerable situation. This issue has yet to be resolved and is discussed in more detail in Section 
4.1.5. This is one example of the many foreseeable conflicts which will most likely arise in the 
near future among states and cities surrounding the Great Lakes. The anxieties among these 





resolution initiative has to take into consideration all their fears and panic over the water 
shortage concern. 
Another ongoing conflict among the municipalities is seemingly, them not willing to share data 
and information with each other. These neighboring authorities cooperate in a lot of water 
projects and are either recipients or providers of services to each other. This requires them to 
communicate frequently, through high quality channels such as more face to face meetings. 
However, this is not always the case. Cooperating on many projects translates in sharing limited 
resources. Thus, these neighboring municipalities feel worried to share all their information, in 
fear of leaking valuable data, which might make them vulnerable to their competitors in 
accessing water sources (anonymous interviewee #5, personal communication, 2020).  
2.4.4. Conflicts between Municipalities and Developers/Contractors 
Municipalities outsource their construction projects to developers, who cooperate with the 
municipalities through agreements. However, based on one of the interviews conducted during 
this research, it seems that these projects are not always properly conducted or inspected before 
being used. For example, “the pipes going underground might not be sealed properly to begin 
with. The connections are bad, or the way the backfills are done on the construction leads to 
basically cracked pipes or leaking pipes that then immediately start leaking just as much as old 
infrastructure, if not more” (anonymous interviewee #3, personal communication, 2020).  
2.4.5. Conflicts between Governments and Businesses  
Another major conflict which is affecting most of the aforementioned stakeholders, is the 
issuance of water extraction permissions from the Great Lakes. This conflict is not only 





related NGOs, since they have the responsibility of preserving the Great Lakes, but also crucial 
for businesses (e.g. water bottling, manufacturing, agriculture) and other stakeholders (e.g. 
municipalities seeking more water sources) which are interested in the Great Lakes to expand or 
improve their operations.  
Regional governments push for less water usage through new regulations, and price increases. 
However, residents, and specially, heavy water consuming businesses, have concerns over the 
increasing water prices over the years. Businesses have tried to adapt to the situation through 
private on-site water treatment systems, to be able to reuse their wastewater a few times before 
sending it back to public treatment facilities. Businesses are also always looking for ways to 
reduce water usage through incorporating new technologies in their supply chain procedures 
(anonymous interviewee #3, personal communication, 2020).  
Regional governments also try to regulate quality standards of the water coming into their water 
treatment plants. For example, the water received from businesses must meet certain 
requirements to be accepted into the regions’ water treatment plants. This is to prevent clogging 
in filters and pipes, or additional costs incurred by the treatment plant to treat the unclean used 
water. This brings more pressure on business to adapt themselves to high standards set by these 
regional and local governments (anonymous interviewee #3, personal communication, 2020). 
2.4.6. Water Transportation Conflicts  
If and when water permission related conflicts are resolved, the method of extraction would be 
another potential topic of dispute. Conveying water with ships, pipelines, interbasin diversions, 
and water bottles are all different approaches which have been considered by stakeholders such 





other types of advantages and disadvantages. These positive and negative aspects make each of 
these methods more or less preferable for the various involved stakeholders. For example, 
businesses might focus more on financial advantages of the approaches as compared to 
municipalities, which must consider long-term social effects as well. But NGOs might solely 
stress the environmental consequences. All of these different, opposing perspectives on water 
extraction methods is another source of potential disputes regarding the Great Lakes.  
2.4.7. Regional and Local Water Utilities’ Fragile Position in Conflicts 
Municipalities (which include all local water utility management authorities such as Townships, 
Cities, Regional Municipalities, etc.), carry a huge responsibility regarding tens of millions of 
people’s water supply. However, their influence and authority to manage conflicts surrounding 
water resources has been proven to be limited. This conclusion stems from many indicators 
which portray a challenging position for local water management authorities. As an example, 
with over 79% of Ontario population’s water requirements met through municipalities, these 
local authorities still struggle to maintain their technical, financial, institutional, and political 
authority over their water systems (J. Kinkead Consulting, 2006; Kreutzwiserl and de Loe, 
2001).  
These challenges are intensified through numerous agreements and acts such as the 2015 Great 
Lakes Protection Act (Government of Canada, 2015), the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 
(International Joint Commission, 2020), the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) 
first signed in 1972 and amended in 2012 (Government of Canada, 2020a), the Great Lakes 
Charter and Annex (Council of Great Lakes Governors, 1985), and the Canada-Ontario 
Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality and Ecosystem Health (Government of Canada, 





municipal official plans and provincial laws (Mann, 2015), have been passed by higher level 
Canadian and international decisionmakers (Ronan, 2016). Although Ontario has approved 
regulations such as the Ontario Water Resources Act of 1990 (Government of Ontario, 2020a), 
and also the 1990 Public Utilities Act (Government of Ontario, 2020b) to support municipalities 
in managing their own water supply systems, federal and provincial power over water resources 
still remain intact and dominant (Kreutzwiserl and de Loe, 2001). 
This superiority of various jurisdictions over local water utilities leaves a gap for in-depth 
investigation to analyze the approaches these regional authorities could deploy to gain a more 
balanced position in conflicts and disputes. This thesis provides a clearer perspective of the 
existing and potential conflicts for these local decisionmakers to better understand their higher-
level authorities’ options, and preferences. This in turn can help them adopt more informed 
decisions when dealing with the other involved stakeholders. These informed decisions lead to 
sustainably enhanced asset management, risk management, and relationships management with 
the customers (Rehan, Knight, Unger, & Haas, 2014; Rehan, Unger, Knight, & Haas, 2014). 
2.4.8. Complexity of the Conflicts 
The conflicts surrounding the Great Lakes have developed a complicated dynamic system of 
different options and preferences for each of the involved stakeholders. To add to the 
aforementioned complexity, recent developments not only in the world’s political arena, but also 
global economic, technological, and social trends, are major variables that make this dynamic 
system prone to considerable changes in its status quo. For example, one of the main new 
external factors affecting the current state, was Donald Trump becoming the U.S. President for a 
period of four years. Trump’s different viewpoints on climate change or other environmental 





the 45th U.S. President, the White House Office of Management and Budget proposed funding 
cuts to the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI) (from $300 million a year to about $10 
million) (Matheny 2017), which raised serious concerns regarding the Great Lakes’ conservation 
and restoration programs. These external changes should also be incorporated into the conflict 
for further insight into the disputes. 
2.5. Knowledge Gap: Lack of an Overall Solution 
As mentioned above, not only water extraction from the Great Lakes against other alternatives 
such as water desalination, rain barrels, or customer awareness for less water usage, can be a 
heated controversial dispute, but also the extraction details such as the timing, permissible 
amount, or methods of water extraction will soon become a serious debate among the 
stakeholders. Using pipelines instead of diversions, or other alternatives such as water shipping 
are different approaches with advantages and disadvantages which would trigger various 
technological, political, financial, and social concerns among activists, businesses, governments, 
and other decisionmakers in the water management field. After the conflict on the extraction 
itself, and the details of water extraction have been resolved, the involved stakeholders might fall 
into another disagreement regarding setting water treatment standards before pouring the used 
water back into the Great Lakes (Figure 2.2).  
The same applies to conflicts which are extended in time. For example, the Great Lakes being 
polluted is a concern which has been the center of attention for several decades. There have been 
peaks of high phosphorous levels in Lake Erie and disputes on this matter in 1970s and also in 
2010s. Therefore, the more recent increase in pollutant levels and the disputes surrounding it, 





Figure 2-2: Inter-related Conflicts Diagram for the Great Lakes 
These various conflicts, which come one after another, and also the numerous uncontrollable 
external variables affecting the stability of the current status, develop a multiphase set of inter-
related disputes which complicate matters among the stakeholders, making them more difficult 
to resolve or predict. One approach to conflict resolution is to provide independent solutions for 
each of the different conflicts occurring among the stakeholders in the various phases they 
interact. Various methods apply this approach to solving the conflicts independently from each 
other. For example, some have investigated the stakeholders’ behaviors through game theory 
(e.g. Madani 2010). 
Dealing with each of these conflicts separately carries several disadvantages. An important 
limitation is that some scenarios in a conflict might not even have to be investigated since they 
are infeasible based on the previous conflicts, but without knowledge of the previous conflicts’ 
details, one cannot understand or eliminate those infeasible scenarios. One other limitation of 
analyzing the disputes independent of each other is that preferences and behavior of the 
stakeholders may not be understood in depth, when the researcher is solely focused on one single 
conflict. The roots of a heated conflict might actually lie somewhere beyond the current 
Water Extraction Permission 
Water Extraction Methods  
Water Treatment Regulations 
• Water Return 
Percentage 












• Other Water 
Sources' 
Desalination 












conflict’s boundaries. Another concern in the traditional approach is that a new option might be 
added to a conflict because of an event in the previous conflicts. Although these new options or 
hidden infeasible scenarios might be researched and recognized when using the previous 
methods, if the conflicts are analyzed together, these intricacies could be investigated easier and 
with less effort. Moreover, going through each conflict separately does not guarantee insightful 
perspectives toward future conflicts.  
In sum, the existing conflict resolution methods do not consider the various conflicts among the 
involved decisionmakers as a continuous thread of disputes (e.g. Schlager, and Heikkila, 2009). 
They focus on each conflict independent from other disputes and try to describe the situation or 
predict approaches to resolve the issue at hand without considering the other disputes among the 
decisionmakers. These approaches clearly have many limitations and thus, in the current line of 
research the objective is to provide an overall solution to the long line of conflicts happening or 
to-be-happening among the decisionmakers. This brings advantages to the involved stakeholders, 
as they would become aware of the different scenarios, which might occur in different phases of 
their interactions with the other stakeholders. Moreover, the uniqueness and importance of the 
Great Lakes, as mentioned before, necessitates a comprehensive approach so that details and 
smaller conflicts are investigated intricately. Many have studied the Great Lakes’ disputes, 
however, depicting all the conflicts in one single framework carries an added value that should 
be sought.  
To further illustrate the value that this thesis is adding to the literature, multiple papers were 
selected from the large body of literature reviewed, and they were analyzed to more clearly 
illustrate the knowledge gap being filled by this thesis (e.g., Kodikara et al., 2010; Kuang, 2015; 





Huang, & Hipel, 1999). These papers’ contributions are summarized in Table 2.1. The papers 
analyzed were categorized into four topics: Great Lakes, water conflicts, conflict analysis 
methods, and papers including studies of interconnected series of conflicts. Most of the papers 
have covered more than two of the aforementioned topics, except for five which provide in-depth 
insight into either conflict analysis methodologies or water conflicts (i.e., Hakvoort, 2010; 
Osman and Nikbakht, 2014; Schlager and Heikkila, 2009; Walk, 2011; Zeitoun, and Warner, 
2006). The previously discussed knowledge gap can be better understood when going through 
Table 2.1. Each of the mentioned papers discuss one or a couple of the four dimensions of the 
greater problem discussed in the preceding paragraphs; none has addressed all the key problem 





















Becker N., & 
Easter W., 
1995 
Water Diversions in the Great 
Lakes Basin Analyzed in a 
Game Theory Framework 
✓ Y ✓  ✓  - 
Using different game theory approaches 
(with 1, 2, and 10 decisionmakers) to 
model and analyze water extraction 
conflicts among 8 States of US and 2 





International Water Conflict 
Resolution: Lessons from 
Comparative Analysis 
✓ n ✓  - - 
Based on combining past treaty 
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problems and reviews the applications of 
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Second-order Water Conflicts 
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Using conflict theory concepts, analyzes 
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The Conflict Pyramid: A 
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Structuring Conflict 
Resolution in Schools 
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Becker N., & 
Easter K.W., 
1999 
Conflict and Cooperation in 
Managing International Water 
Resources Such as the Great 
Lakes 
✓ Y ✓  ✓  - 
Uses the game theory approach to 
demonstrate the potential for cooperative 






Resolving Water Conflicts: A 
Comparative Analysis of 
Interstate River Compacts 
- ✓  - - 
Explores different types of interstate water 
agreements and how they contribute to 
resolving or exacerbating water conflicts. 
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Hipel K.W.,  
Obeidi A., 
Fang L., & 
Kilgour 
D.M., 2018 
Adaptive Systems Thinking in 
Integrated Water Resources 
Management with Insights 
into Conflicts over Water 
Exports 
- 
✓  ✓  - 
Discusses the application of GMCR in 
multiple participant, multiple criteria 





Hydro-hegemony – a 
Framework for Analysis of 
Trans-boundary Water 
Conflicts 
- ✓  - - 
Using a hydro-hegemony bulk framework 




R.D., & de 
Loë R.C., 
2002 
Municipal Capacity to 
Manage Water Problems and 
Conflicts: The Ontario 
Experience 
✓ n ✓  - - 
Assesses financial, structural, political and 
other types of abilities of local 





Multiple Objective Decision 
Making in Water Resources 
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✓  ✓  - 
Conducts a thorough investigation into 
multi-objective decision-making 
























Definitions for Strategic 
Analysis of Generic Water 
Resources Conflicts 
- 
✓  ✓  - 
Reviews stability definitions, which are 
applicable in non-cooperative water 




A New Fast, Reliable 
Filtering Method for Multiple 
Criteria Decision Making 
- - ✓  - 
Uses filtering of alternatives approach to 
investigate complex conflicts (multi-
criteria decision environments). 
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Cai X., 
Lasdon L., & 
Michelsen 
A.M., 2004 
Group Decision Making in 
Water Resources Planning 
Using Multiple Objective 
Analysis 
- 
✓  ✓  - 
Investigates combinations of multi-
objective analysis and multi-participant, 
multi-criteria decision-making methods for 






D., & Ahmad 
S., 2012 
Synthesis of System 
Dynamics Tools for Holistic 
Conceptualization of Water 
Resources Problems 
- 
✓  ✓  - 
Discusses the application of system 
dynamics in systems thinking regarding 





A Monte-Carlo Game 
Theoretic Approach for 
Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making Under Uncertainty 
- 
✓  ✓  - 
Investigates using non-cooperative game 
theory concepts (e.g. the Monte-Carlo 
approach) to model and solve multi-criteria 
decision-making problems without 
requiring weighting for any criteria. 



























- - ✓  - 
Proposes a game theoretic framework that 
quantitatively analyzes the interaction 




Hipel K. W., 
2020 
Diagnosis of Sustainability of 
Trans-Boundary Water 
Governance in the Great 
Lakes Basin 
✓  ✓  - - 
Conducts a thorough literature review 
which shows a positive relationship 
between Trans-boundary water governance 
and reducing tensions and achieving 










Chapter 3 Methodology  
3.1. Methodology Background  
In this section, an introduction is provided regarding causal loop diagrams in System Dynamics 
(SD) analysis, and also, Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), external analysis, 
scenario analysis, and Multi-Participant Multi-Criteria (MPMC) methods. Then, the proposed 
method for the current project, which is a combination of the aforementioned approaches, is 
discussed.  
3.1.1. Causal Loop Diagrams  
System dynamic (SD) analysis is based on the notion that complex structures’ components are in 
continuous, and in many cases, time-delayed relationships which affect their behavior (Forrester, 
1961). Using well-researched qualitative and quantitative causal loops and equations, an SD 
analysis depicts a map of the components of a system, providing a better understanding of their 
relationships (i.e. dynamics), which in turn, sheds light on the past, current, and possible future 
actions of the various components of the system.  
The initial step in an SD analysis is the development of causal loop diagrams. In this phase, the 
interactions among the decisionmakers and other components of the system are shown in a 
simple graphical representation. The influence of each component on other components can be 
positive or negative, developing a combination of positive and negative feedback loops, which 
are linked together in a broader system. Causal loop diagrams are developed qualitatively and do 
not provide the detailed insight required for an in-depth analysis of the system. For this, stock 
and flow diagrams are developed, which quantitatively study accumulation and depletion of the 





This thesis utilizes the first step of the SD approach (i.e. development of the causal loop 
diagrams), to initially investigate the interactions among the components of water conflicts’ 
complex systems. The causal loop diagrams of the conflicts assist in investigating 
decisionmakers’ options, and each option’s effects on other decisionmakers’ actions and options. 
The output of each causal loop diagram analysis is then employed to conduct a well-researched 
GMCR analysis on each of the conflicts of interest.   
3.1.2. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution Method (GMCR) 
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution Method (GMCR) (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour et al., 
1987) is a conflict resolution method developed to enhance understanding of complex disputes 
occurring among two or more decisionmakers. It consists of two parts: modeling and analysis 
(Figure 3.1) (Hipel, Fang, & Kilgour, 2020). 
In the first step of the modeling stage, the situation is thoroughly investigated, and the main 
decisionmakers playing a role in the conflict are identified. Each system has several stakeholders 
who directly or indirectly affect or are affected by the conflict. However, only the most 
influential decisionmakers are brought into the model to avoid over-complicating the modelled 
system (Hipel and Fang, 2021; Hipel et al., 2020). 
The next step is to understand the available option(s) for each decisionmaker. These options are 
the different possible decisions a decisionmaker can select and act upon. The different 






     
Figure 3-1: Standard Graph Model (Fang et al., 1993) 
For example, if there are two decisionmakers and each of them have three options, there would 
be 26 states, which equals to 64 states in total. Although the total number of states developed 
from the different combinations of the options sum up to 64, not all of these states are feasible in 
the real world. To narrow down the states to the feasible ones, concepts such as “mutually 
exclusive option elimination” should be implemented. For instance, in a situation in which a 
decisionmaker has two options: to repair the pipeline, and to change the pipeline altogether, it is 
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have both of these chosen options as happening together are infeasible and would be eliminated 
from the model (Hipel et al., 2020; Xu, Hipel, Kilgour, & Fang, 2018).  
After identifying all possible and feasible states which could occur in the conflict, each 
decisionmaker’s preferences would be ranked ordinally, from the most preferred state to the least 
preferred state. So, a state which puts a decisionmaker in an undesirable position is ranked lower 
in the decisionmaker’s preference list and the decisionmaker would rather not transition to that 
state from another more preferred state (Hipel and Fang, 2021; Hipel et al., 2020).  
If a decisionmaker transitions from a state to another state which is more preferred for that 
particular decisionmaker, it has gone through a unilateral improvement (UI). The most preferred 
situation for a decisionmaker is when it prefers to stay in that state, and not transition (i.e. 
unilaterally improve) to any other state (Fang et al., 1993; Hipel and Fang, 2021). 
After the different options, states, preferences, and unilateral improvements of all the conflict’s 
decisionmakers are identified, a visualizing technique called the Graph Form can aid in better 
investigating the conflict’s different potential outcomes (Hipel et al., 2020).  
The above definitions can be standardized and formulated as below. All definitions are extracted 
from Fang et al. (1993). 
3.1.2.1. Definition 1. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) 
G= [N,S ,(𝐴𝑖)𝑖є𝑁 ,(≽𝑖)𝑖є𝑁 )], and is called a standard graph model. 
The set of all decisionmakers (DMs) is N, where |N| ≥ 2.  
The set of all feasible or distinguished states in the conflict is S, (S,𝐴𝑖), where 2 ≤ |S| ≤ N. Also 





For each DM i ∈ N, 𝐴𝑖 ⊂ S × S is the set of state transitions or set of all arcs controlled by i. In 
other words,  𝐴𝑖 is the set of unilateral available moves for DM i. 
 (𝑠1 , 𝑠2) is an arc in DM i’s directed graph, if DM i can reach, in a one-step transition, state 𝑠2 
from state 𝑠1. 
DM i’s preference on S is shown by a pair of binary relationships {≻𝑖  , ~𝑖} on S; where  
𝑠2 ≻𝑖 𝑠1 means DM i prefers 𝑠2  to 𝑠1, and 𝑠2 ~𝑖 𝑠1 means DM i equally prefers 𝑠2 and 𝑠1. The 
relationship 𝑠2 ≽𝑖 𝑠1 means that DM i prefers state 𝑠2 to 𝑠1 or equally prefers 𝑠1 and 𝑠2.  
In a standard graph model, based on DM i’s elicited preferences over states, S can be partitioned 
into two sets, relative to a particular state s ∈ S (i.e., s is being assessed for stability), as follows: 
𝛷𝑖
+(𝑠) = {𝑠𝑚 ∈ S : 𝑠𝑚 ≻𝑖 s} is the set of all states that DM i prefers to state s; and 𝛷𝑖
≤(𝑠) = {𝑠𝑚 ∈ 
S : s ≽𝑖 𝑠𝑚} is the set of all states that DM i finds equally or less preferred to state s.  
(1) ≻𝑖 is asymmetric; hence, for all 𝑠1, 𝑠2 ∈ S, 𝑠1 ≻𝑖 𝑠2and 𝑠2 ≻𝑖 𝑠1 cannot hold simultaneously. 
(2) ~𝑖 is reflexive; thus, for any 𝑠1 ∈ S, 𝑠1 ~𝑖 𝑠1. 
(3) ~𝑖 is symmetric; i.e, for all 𝑠1, 𝑠2 ∈ S, if 𝑠1 ~𝑖  𝑠2  then 𝑠2  ~𝑖  𝑠1. 
(4) {≻𝑖, ~𝑖} is complete; thus, for all 𝑠1, 𝑠2 ∈ S, exactly one of 𝑠1 ≻𝑖 𝑠2, 𝑠2 ≻𝑖 𝑠1 or 𝑠1 ~𝑖 𝑠2 is 
true. 
3.1.2.2. Definition 2. Reachable List 
For i ∈ N, and s ∈ S DM i’s reachable list from state s is the set {𝑠2∈ S|(𝑠1, 𝑠2) ∈ 𝐴𝑖} denoted by 
𝑅𝑖(s) ⊂ S. When individual DMs unilaterally cause transitions (unilateral move (Ums)) among 
states from an initial state, or status quo, to a final state that is stable for all DMs.  
3.1.2.3. Definition 3. Unilateral Improvement (UI) List for Each Decisionmaker 
In the Graph Model, the set of all states that DM i can unilaterally reach from state s ∈ S in one 





for that DM to which he or she can unilaterally move in one step. 𝑅𝑖(s)’s two subsets are: 𝑅𝑖
+ (s) 
= 𝑅𝑖(s) ∩ 𝛷𝑖
+(𝑠) is the set of all UIs from state s for DM i; and 𝑅𝑖
≤(s) = 𝑅𝑖(s) 𝛷𝑖
≤(𝑠) is the set of 
all unilateral disimprovements and equally preferred states from state s for DM i. 
 
Now that a comprehensive model of the situation is developed, the researcher should have a 
thorough understanding of the dispute and can initiate the analysis phase.  
In the first step of the analysis section, possible stable states for each decisionmaker are 
determined. This step is called Individual Stability Analysis. Initially, a comprehensive 
examination of possible moves and countermoves by the decisionmakers in the conflict is 
provided. Individual Stability Analysis lays out answers to “what if” questions. For example, 
what happens if Decisionmaker A changes its decision on Option 1, and thus, the conflict 
changes from State 1 to State 3? Then, can Decisionmaker B unilaterally improve from State 3 to 
State 5? And if that happens, is State 5 less or more preferred for Decisionmaker A, who initially 
decided to move from State 1? Each of these scenarios are examined in the Stability Analysis 
phase, and all possible outcomes are developed through the use of mathematically developed 
solution concepts. The definitions of these solution concepts is provided below in Table 3.1. 
Through the use of these four solution concepts, stable states for each decisionmaker are 
determined. This refers to a state which is not advantageous for the decisionmaker to move away 
from. At the end of the Stability Analysis, states which are stable under each solution concept for 
all decisionmakers, are called equilibrium states and would be proposed as a possible resolution 
to the dispute. A Nash or SEQ stable state for all decisionmakers is a strong equilibrium. These 
equilibria reflect actual outcomes which occur in reality. However, a GMR or SMR state for all 





likely to happen (He, 2015). Therefore, although all the four solution concepts are calculated and 
presented in the appendices, Nash and SEQ states are presented as the final equilibria in the 
results section of this thesis.  
Table 3.1 Solution Concepts (Fang et al. (1993)) 
Solution Concepts Stability Description 
Nash stability (R) 
“A focal decisionmaker cannot unilaterally move to a 
more preferred state” 
General Metarationality 
(GMR) 
“All of the focal decisionmaker’s unilateral 
improvements are sanctioned by subsequent unilateral 
moves by others” 
Symmetric 
Metarationality (SMR) 
“All of the focal decisionmaker’s unilateral 
improvements are still sanctioned even after a 
possible response by this decisionmaker” 
Sequential stability (SEQ) 
“All of the focal decisionmaker’s unilateral 
improvements are sanctioned by subsequent unilateral 
improvements by others” 
 
The above solution concept definitions can be standardized and formulated as below. All 
definitions are extracted from Fang et al. (1993). 
3.1.2.4. Definition 4. Nash Stability (Rationality) 
For i ∈ N, a state s ∈ S is Nash stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈ 𝑆𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖 , iff 𝑅𝑖
+ (s) = Ø. Under the 
Nash solution concept, a DM will move to a more preferred state whenever possible, without 
regard to any possible countermoves by the opponent. 
3.1.2.5. Definition 5. General Metarationality (GMR) 
For i ∈  N, a state s ∈  S is general metarational stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈ 𝑆𝐺𝑀𝑅𝑖, iff for 
every t ∈ 𝑅𝑖
+ (s)  there exists 𝑅𝑗  (t) ∩ 𝛷𝑖





DM i iff for every UI i can take advantage of, the opponent, DM j, can subsequently move to a 
state that is at most as good for i as the original state s. 
3.1.2.6. Definition 6. Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 
For i ∈ N, a state s ∈ S is symmetric metarational stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑅𝑖, iff for 
every t ∈ 𝑅𝑖
+ (s), 𝑅𝑗  (t)  ∩ 𝛷𝑖
≤(𝑠) ≠ Ø, and for all h ∈ 𝑅𝑗  (t) ∩ 𝛷𝑖
≤(𝑠), 𝑅𝑖(h)  ∩  𝛷𝑖
+(𝑠) = Ø. A 
state s is symmetric metarational stable for DM i iff not only every UI for i from s is sanctioned 
by the opponent, but no unilateral counterresponse by DM i can leave it better off than the 
original state s. 
3.1.2.7. Definition 7. Sequential Stability (SEQ) 
For i ∈ N, a state s ∈ S is sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by s ∈  𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑄𝑖 , iff for every t ∈ 𝑅𝑖
+ 
(s) there exists 𝑅𝑗
+ (t) ∩ 𝛷𝑖
≤(𝑠) ≠ Ø. A state s is sequentially stable for DM i iff every UI for i 
from s, state s is credibly sanctioned by the sanctioner DM j. 
 
After equilibrium states are identified, sensitivity analyses can be conducted to evaluate and 
validate the robustness of the analysis results. In this phase, changes in the model parameters are 
applied to examine the model. These changes can vary from decisionmaker preference changes, 
to adding or modifying their options. Analyzing the effects of these changes on the new 
equilibrium states would help the researcher validate the previously developed model. 
To employ the GMCR, a comprehensive decision support system called the GMCRII (Fang, 
Hipel, Kilgour, & Peng, 2003a; Fang, Hipel, Kilgour, & Peng, 2003b; Hipel, Kilgour, Fang, & 
Peng 1997) is used in this thesis. The GMCRII implements delicately designed data structures 
and algorithms to generate possible states, eliminate infeasible states, and specify potential state 





algorithms which rank preferences of the decisionmakers. This decision support system 
contributes to better studying real world conflicts based on the GMCR methodology (Fang et al., 
2003a; Fang et al., 2003b). 
3.1.3. External Analysis  
After a conflict is studied with previous related conflicts analyses acting as its inputs, an in-depth 
understanding of the stakeholders, and their current and previous options, preferences, and 
relationships with other stakeholders playing a role in the conflict in interest is developed.  
This thorough set of information gives us valuable insight into the current status of the system. 
However, the current status quo and equilibria (future possible stable states for all 
decisionmakers), are mostly based on the stakeholders’ relationships and their decisions, which 
are highly influenced by their options and preferences. In other words, GMCR builds a system 
which is developed internally, depending on the stakeholders’ situations. The developed 
equilibria do not factor in the possible, yet important, external variables when predicting the 
future of the conflict.  
Non-sudden changes might be considered by the stakeholders when making decisions, but in 
most cases, sudden changes or external shocks which might hugely affect the status quo, or 
significantly change the equilibriums are not examined when conducting SDs or GMCRs. This is 
the reason why conducting an external analysis and scenario analysis is proposed in the current 
presented framework, to close the gap when predicting future possible happenings in a conflict. 
As discussed previously, the external environment has a huge effect on ongoing conflicts among 
the stakeholders. These external variables affect, and are affected by the stakeholders, but cannot 





country, a national economic recession, unprecedented population growth, are all external 
variables which negatively or positively affect all the stakeholders such as the government, 
businesses, and NGOs, yet none of these decisionmakers can completely prevent them from 
happening.  
These external variables change the dynamics of the relationships in a conflict, especially when 
they occur instantly, and act as a sudden shock to the system. In these instances, the stakeholders 
are not prepared for the occurrence, and their status in the system changes suddenly. This might 
raise even more conflicts among the stakeholders, since they are suddenly confronted by more 
issues to process and resolve, on top of the previously existing disputes.  
Such external variables have been categorized in various models. One of the more common 
models used in investigating external variables for strategy formulation, is the PESTLE (Aguilar, 
1967; Perera, 2017). The letters of the model name stand for: Political, Economic, Social, 
Technological, Legal, and Environmental variables. In this model, possible occurrences within 
each of these six categories and their effects on the related situation are studied (Aguilar, 1967; 
Perera, 2017).  
For example, what will happen if a president or prime minister of a country is replaced by 
another, different in perspective from the previous one? How will this political change affect the 
dynamics of the conflict under study? Would the stakeholders’ options or preferences change in 
light of the new political environment? Would this change be in their favor, enhancing their 
position in the disputes they have with others? Moreover, would this political change bring with 
itself a legal shock as well? Would laws or regulations relevant to the dispute also change? How 





or decrease operational costs of the decisionmakers involved in the dispute. A legal change 
might also increase the time and effort one must contribute for a certain performance level. A 
legal change might also change authority powers of the disputes’ stakeholders (Aguilar, 1967; 
Perera, 2017).  
In addition to the external political and legal variables, social and demographic changes can also 
influence a conflict’s system. For example, social trends can influence the dynamics of a dispute. 
When people of the society become aware of environmental crises or climate change 
consequences, they change their buying and consuming behaviours, which affects relevant 
businesses in a positive or negative way.  
A huge flood might also increase or decrease the resources available to a business, and this 
affects its power over other stakeholders in relation with that business. This represents the 
external environmental variable of the PESTLE model.  
Using PESTLE as an external variable analysis in the current proposed framework, provides us 
with the external perspective, required after conducting the GMCR. After studying the various 
external factors, which might affect the conflict’s system dynamics, enough information exists to 
discuss possible future happenings.  
3.1.4. Scenario Analysis 
Decision making regarding natural (e.g. water) resources management usually involve various 
uncertain variables, present in complex social systems with profound uncertainties (Harwood & 
Stokes 2003; Kujala, Burgman, & Moilanen 2013; Ludwig, Hilborn, & Walters 1993). Although 





natural resources management interventions can be explained, to a high extent, by these 
uncertain variables (Punt & Donovan 2007).   
Because of this, various support tools have been developed to reduce these uncertainties, 
increase system dynamics transparency, and assist in decision-making. These tools enhance 
system dynamics exploration, stakeholder investigation, and potential future prediction (Bekessy 
and Selinske, 2017). One of these tools is scenario analysis, in which multiple points of view are 
gathered and shared to create alternative views of the future. Scenario planning as a method of 
investigating shocks in social decision-making systems, has been frequently used in the recent 
literature.  
Scenarios are used to come up with enhanced plans to act in face of different possible situations. 
Scenarios also provide flexibility for the management of conflicts. In developing scenarios, a 
focus question is asked, and the different scenarios are developed in an attempt to answer that 
question. The focus question acts as an initial anchor before proceeding to the analysis section, 
since it establishes the main question to be answered during the analysis process.  
The most important benefit of scenario planning is that it helps the stakeholders to be proactive 
in the face of uncontrollable external variables. Being reactive, as opposed to being proactive to 
problems when they arise, limits the ability of the decisionmaker to spend time on strategizing 
and planning before implementing any solutions to the problem. Being able to project returns or 
losses of different possible futures, before they occur, saves time, and increases the quality of the 
decisions, since they have been developed in calm and no-stress conditions.  
The scenarios analyzed in this thesis, are developed based on a “bottom up” approach, which has 





(2007), Svenfelt et al. (2010), Höjer et al. (2008), and Burch (2010)). One of the main features of 
this approach is that the stakeholders of the topic-of-interest play a major role in constructing the 
key scenarios (Chermack 2004; Shaw et al. 2009). The idea behind this, is that since the 
stakeholders will be the main decisionmakers should any of those scenarios turn into reality, it is 
best that they are involved in the process of investigating them, so that the stakeholders are 
engaged in tailor-making the scenarios built around their concerns. This approach prevents 
conforming to global perspective scenarios, which have already been developed by other 
institutions. For example, several climate change scenarios have been constructed by 
international institutions such as the UN, however, investigating customized scenarios for 
specific regions or system dynamics, is much more effective in understanding certain situations.  
A major limitation of using the bottom-up approach when developing scenarios is that it is 
generally time-consuming and/or costly, since stakeholder involvement (i.e. data collection 
through interviews) requires more time and effort than merely gathering information through 
secondary data gathering methods. However, using interview guidelines is proposed to speed up 
the scenario development process. 
In this thesis, the PESTLE model is used as a starting point in developing the scenarios. In this 
approach, the interviewees are asked open-ended questions, to gather their input on different 
possible occurrences within each of the six PESTLE model factors. For example, questions 
might follow a similar flow to the following: In thinking about uncontrollable economic factors, 
what might be a reason for you to wake up in the middle of the night? What are the biggest 
uncertainties relevant to this issue which cause you concern? If this economic issue does actually 





dispute? What options would you think you might have, and what key decisions do you think 
you should make, should this economic shock/change occur? 
After gathering all information from the stakeholders, scenario narratives should be written to 
develop a thorough perspective on each possible scenario. The purpose here is to tie all the ideas 
and previous information into one or a few scenario narratives. The scenario narratives provide 
support for the decisionmakers to take different courses of action in different conditions. 
3.1.5. The Multiple Participant Multiple Criteria Decision Making 
The MPMC (Multiple Participant Multiple Criteria) approach is a method used to analyze 
situations in which multiple decisionmakers with multiple objectives or preferences are involved 
(Hipel, Radford, & Fang, 1993) (Figure 3.2). This means that each decisionmaker considers 
multiple criteria when trying to decide upon a course of action when faced with other 
decisionmakers.  
An example for a Single Participant Multiple Criteria (SPMC) decision can be when one person 
is trying to select and buy a car among other cars, having in mind different colors, makes, 
models, and other factors (i.e. different criteria). A Multiple Participant Single Criteria (MPSC) 
occasion is when four family members must rank their preferred cars using one single criterion 
(i.e. the color of the car). An MPMC situation, however, is when the four family members are to 
decide about the car as a group, using various criteria. Needless to mention that each individual 








The following are components of the method (Hipel et al., 1993): 
A set of Decisionmakers (DMs), {𝐷𝑀𝑖, i = 1, 2, . . ., n},  
A set of states, {𝑈𝑗, j = 1, 2, . . ., m}, resulting from possible actions by the DMs,  
A set of criteria, {𝐶𝑖𝑘 , k= 1, 2, . . ., 𝑙𝑖}, for DM i, i = 1, 2, ..., n,  
A set of evaluations, {𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘, j = 1, 2, . . ., m}, for DM i, i = 1, 2, ..., n, and criterion k, k = 1, 2, ..., 

















































































Although each decisionmaker is confronted by an SPMC situation when dealing with their own 
criteria, the MPMC attempts to resolve the conflict considering all the decisionmakers’ 
objectives as compared to only one. Then, using Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), 
each participant’s decision is finalized independent from the other decisionmakers. There are 
various MCDA methods which can be used to solve such cases. For example, the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) systematically ranks the participant’s preferences by comparing them 
to each other two at a time. The result is a prioritized list of states for each participant based on 
the different criteria each of them hold for themselves. In this thesis however, MCDA is 
conducted using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) preference tables, which are 
discussed more in detail later on. After an MCDA is conducted (either through AHP, GMCR 
preference tables, or other methods) for each single participant, a final ranking of the available 
states is developed to investigate the situation as a whole (Hipel et al., 1993). 
3.2. Methodology Used for this Thesis 
As mentioned previously, conflicts over the Great Lakes are complex and can occur 
simultaneously or one after another. One approach is to provide solutions for each of those 
conflicts independently from the other disputes. However, another approach, which is used here, 
is to investigate each conflict having in mind the previous and future conflicts (Figure 3.3).  








For example, the 2010s conflict over increasing pollutants in Lake Erie is analyzed with having 
the 1970s conflicts and context in mind. Possible biases and previous preferences that each of the 
decisionmakers had in the previous disputes are brought into account, and this gives useful 
insight into the next phases’ conflicts, providing yet better solutions and predictions. 
For a better understanding of this method, the different phases of data collection and analysis are 
discussed here (Figure 3.4). Initially, to get to an overall view of, and hence solution for a 
conflict, the current dynamics are studied and shown in a causal loop diagram. The development 
of the diagram feedback loops provides insights into the relationships among the decisionmakers. 
This is an important, yet challenging phase of the project. Reliable, valid information regarding 
each of the decisionmakers is hard to obtain, and understanding relationships between each of 
them is another difficult part of this phase. In this phase, the multiple interrelated conflicts 
among the decisionmakers are extracted using the information review process.  
After the current-status diagram is created using the gathered information, preferences and 
options of the stakeholders are investigated and categorized. Then, the various potential conflicts 
among the decisionmakers are determined and analyzed in detail. This is done through the 
GMCRII decision support system which is based on the GMCR methodology. After this phase is 
completed, not only the current status of each of the involved decisionmakers are assessed, but 
also their relationships and interrelated conflicts, plus the suggested solutions (i.e. equilibria for 
the stakeholders) for each of these and future disputes are determined.  
After this initial conflict investigation has concluded, the same process is applied to the next 





information inputs for the next conflict analysis. Using this approach, the history of the conflicts 
















        Figure 3.4 Phases of the Currently Used Methodology 
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The external variables affecting the current status of the decisionmakers, and the ongoing and 
future conflicts among them should also be considered. These external variables are studied 
using the PESTLE analysis approach. This tool gives us insight into external factors in the 
following six categories: political topics (e.g. governmental instabilities), economic concerns 
(e.g. inflation rates), social trends (e.g. water awareness), technological happenings (e.g. water 
extraction techniques), legal changes (e.g. water treatment standards), and environmental issues 
(e.g. floods) (Aguilar, 1967; Perera, 2017).  
Each of these external factors develop shocks, potentially greatly changing the current status of 
the decisionmakers, and the dynamics of the current systems. The ongoing conflicts will also 
likely change due to these external happenings. Discussing these external variables provide 
different scenarios regarding each of the conflicts, better preparing the decisionmakers to deal 
with them. In this phase, all possible consequences of a conflict are determined.  
3.3. Data Collection  
3.3.1. Secondary Data Collection 
Information regarding the current status of the stakeholders (and other parts of this thesis) is 
collected from multiple sources, varying from peer reviewed published papers to verified media 
articles. These sources shed light on the previous and ongoing disputes among the 
decisionmakers involved in the Great Lakes. Moreover, reviewing and bringing in relevant 






3.3.2. Primary Data Collection: Interviews 
Another source, which is used to collect data and also to verify the already gathered information, 
is interviewing stakeholders involved in the Great Lakes conflicts. These interviews are helpful 
in gaining insight into the decisionmakers’ preferences and roots of the current and potential 
conflicts among the decisionmakers.  
3.3.2.1. Interview Process 
The below process took place regarding each individual selected for interviewing.  
- Through thorough investigation of the secondary data from the previous step, potential 
interviewees were identified. Some of these individuals were introduced by the current 
thesis’ Supervisors, or by the other interviewees. The details on selecting the potential 
interviewees to be approached is discussed later in this section.  
- A recruitment email was initially sent to the potential interviewees. In this email, the 
individual was asked to participate in a 60-90 minute interview on topics related to the 
Waterloo region water management systems.  
- After and if the individual accepted to take part in the interview, a letter of information 
and a consent form was sent to the interviewee to read and sign before the meeting. The 
letter of information includes a little information about the study, and the processes to 
give the individual assurance that the process and communicated information would be 
handled in accordance with the University research ethics guidelines.  
- The interviews took place either in person, or through phone calls. In total, six (6) 
interviews took place.  
- A set of questions were prepared for these meetings. The prepared questions were used as 





such as relevant stakeholders, existing and potential conflicts among the system’s 
stakeholders, or external variables affecting the system were some topics covered in the 
interviews.  
- After each interview, an appreciation email was sent to the interviewee to thank the 
interviewee for their participation in the research project.  
- Each interview was then transcribed, and the material was incorporated into different 
sections of the thesis.  
All forms related to the interviews are provided in Appendix A.  
3.3.2.2. Interview Questions 
As mentioned previously, the interviews with the main decisionmakers’ representatives were 
based on a set of questions, which are provided in Appendix B. However, a semi-structured 
framework was used for the interviews, meaning that based on the interviewees’ answers, the 
interview took different directions.  
3.3.2.3. Identifying Interviewees 
The interviews took place after secondary data collection, and before finalizing modelling and 
analysis of the results. The potential interviewees were identified and asked to take part in the 
research project based on secondary data collection, Supervisors’ suggestions, and other 
interviewees’ opinions.  
Attempts were made to get in contact with different types of stakeholders, to achieve some 
diversity and to reduce the impact of any biased perspectives in gathering and categorizing the 
data. Overall, six (6) individuals were interviewed in 3 months. From these six people, two were 





other two were researchers at the University of Waterloo. Three of these six individuals were 
interviewed multiple times and were in frequent communication with the author throughout the 
data collection and analysis phases of this thesis. In addition to these six individuals, insightful 
discussions with more than 20 people have contributed to the investigation and interpretation of 
the conflicts discussed in this thesis. 
Since this thesis is focused on conflicts among water management system’s stakeholders, some 
discussed topics in the interviews were of a sensitive nature. For example, water is distributed 
and sold by Waterloo Municipalities to consumers, however, before it is handed over to the 
municipalities, it has to be extracted, treated, and distributed by the Region of Waterloo. Because 
of this situation, the municipalities might not be that willing to support water conservation 
initiatives, since firstly, they are not in charge of finding water sources, and secondly, the more 
they sell, the more money they make. This issue was discussed in one of the interviews. 
However, naming the interviewee might risk his/her position. For this reason, the six 
interviewees and also, the other 20 contributors’ identities are not specifically referenced 








Chapter 4 GMCR Cases and Results 
To better introduce GMCR method’s processes and get a better sense of the Great Lakes water 
management system’s conflicts, two cases are analyzed in this chapter using GMCR, however, 
the complete external analysis and scenario planning procedures are not conducted here. A full 
analysis of a relevant case including external and scenario analyses is presented in the 5th 
Chapter. 
4.1. Case I: Great Lakes Water Extraction Permissions 
The first analyzed conflict in the thesis is the conflict over Great Lakes water extraction 
permissions. For the sake of introducing the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) 
method (Fang et al.,1993; Kilgour et al., 1987), the GMCRII decision support system (Fang et 
al., 2003a; Fang et al., 2003b; Hipel et al., 1997), and to develop a simpler and more sensible 
model, only two decisionmakers (The Great Lakes Protectors and The Great Lakes Water 
Seekers) are focused on as the main decisionmakers of the conflict. In a sense, these are 
abstractions that serve to conceptually represent real classes of decisionmakers to explore and 
demonstrate key concepts developed as part of this thesis. 
The Protectors try to reduce water demand and prevent everyone else outside the watershed from 
accessing the Great Lakes as much as possible. They not only have the authority over permission 
issuance, but also oversee water extraction operations should permissions be issued. However, 
Water Seekers are the category of stakeholders which seek access to the Great Lakes water 
source. They require enormous amounts of water to run their businesses and thus, search for 





desalination. This information is determined by collecting data from various sources regarding 
previous and current statuses of these decisionmakers.  
4.1.1. Causal Loop Diagram  
The causal loop diagram for the current conflict is provided in Figure 4.1.  
 






For example, a negative feedback loop in the system starts with increased water extraction 
permits being issued by authorities (i.e. Water Protectors). This increases Water Seekers’ 
revenues since they would expand their businesses based on the new water extraction permits. 
This would in turn, pour investments into the businesses which require water permits. When 
more investment is initiated, more applications would be submitted to benefit from the permit 
issuance process. However, the applications coming in, gradually decrease the permit issuance 
rate. 
4.1.2. Decisionmakers’ Options 
After initially investigating the situation through the system’s causal loop diagram, the possible 
options of each decisionmaker are determined (Table 4.13). All GMCRII phases for this set of 
analysis are shown in Appendix C. We have focused on four options in total, two for each 
decisionmaker.  
Table 4.1 Case I Decisionmakers and Their Options 
The Great Lakes 
Protectors 
1 Issue Permissions for Water 
Extraction 
2 Allow for Exceptions Under Strict 
Limitations 
The Great Lakes Water 
Seekers 
3 Seek Access to the Great Lakes 
Water Resource 
4 Seek Alternative Water Supplies 
(Well Water Treatment, Desalination, 
Rain Barrels, and etc.) 
 
The Protectors consider two options. The first is to issue more permissions for water extraction 
to any stakeholder such as cities and regions outside of the Great Lakes watershed, or different 
heavy water consumers. Another option for the Protectors would be to impose tight restrictions 





most situations where strict limitations exist, the decisionmaker which extracts water must not 
only release the used water back into the Great Lakes, but also treat it before doing so.  
An option for the Great Lakes Water Seekers, is to seek access to the Great Lakes through the 
regulators. This is important, since these decisionmakers require this permission to be flexible 
regarding their chosen water supply strategy. However, they can also seek alternative approaches 
to supply their required water. They can treat and use well or surface waters. In some cases, 
although more costly, they can also move towards more technologically advanced methods such 
as desalination. The Region of Waterloo suggested rain barrels to its clients as a method to 
satisfy their water shortages. These alternatives are a way of maintaining continuous and reliable 
sources of water for these water dependent organizations.  
Each of the four options can be chosen or not by the decisionmakers. The combinations of 
decisionmakers’ decisions (chosen options) develop different states. Therefore, the four options 
in the current conflict, produce sixteen (16) states which represent the combinations of the 
options that might occur (Table 4.2). Each state refers to a combination of decisions that could be 
chosen by the decisionmakers. In the below table, “N” means that the option is not chosen by the 
decisionmaker. And ”Y” means that the option has been chosen by the decisionmaker. 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N 
2 N N Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y 
3 N N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y 






As an example of the states, State 1 is a condition in which none of the mentioned options is 
chosen by the two decisionmakers. This means that the Protectors will not issue more permits. 
Moreover, the Protectors do not allow any exceptions for water extraction. The Water Seekers 
would also not seek access to the Great Lakes. Moreover, they would be satisfied with their 
current supplies, meaning that they would not seek alternative methods for increasing their water 
supply. Another example is State 16 (the current situation which is titled as the status quo and is 
shaded in Table 4.2), where the Protectors would only issue permits for rare exceptions, and 
impose many more restrictions on water withdrawal and water treatment standards and other 
water extraction related issues (e.g. the city of Waukesha which was mentioned in the 
introduction). However, Water Seekers would actively seek permission to extract water from the 
Great Lakes in spite of tight restrictions. They would also seek alternatives to guarantee their 
water supply from other resources. This means that the Water Seekers would adapt themselves to 
the challenging restrictions imposed by the Protectors to expand their water resource reach.  
4.1.3. Feasible and Infeasible States  
In the next step, after identifying the decisionmakers and their options, states that are identified 
as impossible to occur based on logical interpretations of the state presented by the particular 
combination of options are called infeasible states and removed from the model. In other words, 
combinations of options that are mutually exclusive create logically infeasible outcomes (Hipel 
and Fang, 2021). 
From the 16 possible states (noted in Table 4.2), four states are deemed infeasible (states 6, 7, 13, 
and 15). This is because in these states, the Protectors choose option number one (to issue many 





consumers regarding water extraction, water treatment, and other issues) at the same time, 
however, this is not feasible in the real world. Thus, these states are removed from the analysis.  




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N 
2 N N Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y 
3 N N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y 
4 N N N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
 
All feasible states are renumbered as shown in Table 4.3. The status quo is State 12 which is 
shaded in Table 4.4 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N 
2 N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
3 N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 
4 N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
4.1.4. Decisionmakers’ Preferences  
Decisionmaker’s preferences are ranked from the most preferred to the least preferred state for 
each decisionmaker (Table 4.4 and Table 4.5). Table 4.4 shows that the Protectors prefer state 
number 7, as they do not have to permit any new water extractions and they also do not approve 
of any exceptions. Moreover, in this state, the Water Seekers are interested in alternative water 
sources instead of seeking access to the Great Lakes. The Protector’s least preferred state is State 
5, in which they issue more permissions to anyone who applies. Moreover, the Water Seekers are 





the Protectors are in favor of not permitting more water extractions to more decisionmakers, with 
more restrictions on possible exceptions. 




7 1 10 4 9 3 12 6 8 2 11 5 
1 N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y 
2 N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
3 N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
4 Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 
 
Table 4.5 shows preferences for the Water Seekers (in the “Preference Vector” row). Water 
Seeker’s most preferred state is State 11as there is permission for more water extraction, and the 
Water Seekers are interested in accessing the Great Lakes and also other alternatives. The least 
preferred state for them would be State 1 in which there are no water extraction permissions and 
no exceptions. And also, they are stuck with the current water sources, not seeking access to any 
additional water sources.  




11 5 8 2 12 6 9 3 10 7 4 1 
1 Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
2 N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N 
3 Y Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y N 
4 Y N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N N 
 
As can be seen from the above table, States 11, 5, 8, and 2 stand higher in the Water Seeker’s 
preference table than the other eight states. This is because in all of these states, the Protectors 
have already chosen to issue permissions for water extractions (Option 1 is selected), making 
Water Seekers position much more relaxed. The Water Seekers can extract as much water as 
they require (Option 3 is selected; States 11 and 5), without the Protectors fiercely opposing 





additional amounts of water, they can simply stop extracting more water (Option 3 is not 
selected; States 8 and 2). 
The next four preferences for Water Seekers are States 12, 6, 9, and 3, in which Option 2 is 
selected by the Protectors, instead of Option 1. In these states, the Protectors are not openly 
issuing approvals for all extraction applications, but only allow for limited and strictly regulated 
exceptions to be considered. This might not be an ideal situation for Water Seekers, however, it 
is still much better than not having the chance of extracting water (States 10, 7, 4, & 1). 
4.1.5. Stability Analysis 
In the next step of the graph model technique, stability analysis using logical rules (i.e. solution 
concepts; Table 3.1) that describe decisionmakers’ strategic interactions are applied to every 
outcome in the conflict model. The result is shown in a table, called the “Tableau Form” (Fraser 
and Hipel, 1979; Fraser and Hipel, 1984) (Table 4.7).  
Table 4.7 Case I Preferences and Stability Analysis 
The Great Lakes Protectors 
Overall 
Stability 
X X E X X X X X X X X X 
Decisionmaker 
Stability 
R R R R U U U U U U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
7 1 10 4 9 3 12 6 8 2 11 5 
UIs 
    
7 1 10 4 7 1 10 4         
9 3 12 6 
The Great Lakes Water Seekers 
Decisionmaker 
Stability 
R S S S R S S S R U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
11 5 8 2 12 6 9 3 10 7 4 1 
UIs 
 
11 11 11 
 
12 12 12 
 





7 7    
8 
   
6 
   
4 
* E: Equilibrium, R: Rational, S: Sequentially sanctioned, U: Unstable for a particular decisionmaker, X: 





For example, based on the Nash Stability solution concept (R), the most preferred state for each 
decisionmaker is always rational. This is because rationally, the decisionmaker would not move 
from it to a less preferred state.  
States indicated by “U” in Table 4.7 represent unstable states for a particular decisionmaker. 
These states are considered unstable since the decisionmaker has the opportunity to unilaterally 
improve to another more preferred state instead of remaining in that less preferred status.  
For example, the Protectors change their option selections from State 9 (N, Y, N, Y) to State 7 
(N, N, N, Y). Through this move, they unilaterally improve their status from a less preferred 
state (9) to a more preferred state (7), without any required interventions from the Water Seekers 
(Table 4.8).  
Table 4.8. Example of an Unstable State 
State 9 7 10 
Protectors 
N N N 
Y N N 
Water Seekers 
N N Y 
Y Y Y 
 
Then, the Water Seekers would unilaterally improve (without any actions required from the 
Protectors) from State 7 (N, N, N, Y) to State 10 (N, N, Y, Y) to enhance their status in the 
conflict. However, going through the preference table for Protectors, it is known that State 10 is 
more preferred than State 9 for Protectors. So, the Protectors initial unilateral improvement from 
State 9 (to State 7), results in the conflict to end up in State 10, which is more preferred for the 







In some cases, although the decisionmaker’s true intention is to improve to a better state, the 
consequence of its unilateral improvement may not be in its favor since it may give the 
opportunity to the other decisionmakers to unilaterally improve despite its disagreement. As 
mentioned before in Table 3.1, under the solution concepts, these initial states are called 
sequentially sanctioned (Hipel et al., 1993) and are shown by “S” in Table 4.7. 
As an example, the Water Seekers can unilaterally improve from State 6 (N, Y, Y, N) to State 12 
(N, Y, Y, Y). Then, the Protectors would unilaterally improve from State 12 to State 10, since it 
is a more preferred state for them. But State 10 is a less preferred state than State 6 for Water 
Seekers. In these situations, it is rational for the decisionmakers to stay at their current state 
rather than unilaterally improve to begin with. Therefore, State 6 is considered to be sequentially 
sanctioned for Water Seekers (Table 4.9).  
Table 4.9 Example of a Sequentially Sanctioned State 
State 6 12 10 
Protectors 
N N N 
Y Y N 
Water Seekers 
Y Y Y 
N Y Y 
 
After identifying the stability of individual states for each decisionmaker, equilibrium states 
which are stable states for all the decisionmakers are identified. These states are shown by “E” in 
Table 4.7 and are states in which there is overall stability among the decisionmakers. This is a 







reached to an equilibrium which is rational for all decisionmakers, meaning that everyone is 
stable and cannot unilaterally improve to another state. The remaining states that are indicated by 
“X” represent states that are unstable for at least one decisionmaker. 
Having State 10 is stable for both the Protectors and the Water Seekers while the other states are 
stable under some but not all solution concepts. Therefore, State 10 is the equilibrium state in 
this model. In this state, the Protectors would not be issuing more permissions to additional 
decisionmakers to extract water from the Great Lakes. They would also not approve of any 
exceptions for any applications regarding extracting water from the vulnerable water source. The 
Water Seekers however, would be actively seeking access not only to the Great Lakes, but also 
to other possible alternatives they could access. 
State 10 to end up as an equilibrium state in this conflict, is also reflected in reality. An example, 
also briefly mentioned in the Literature Review Chapter, is Wisconsin State’s Waukesha city, 
which is very close to, but outside Great Lakes watershed. Radium contamination of this City’s 
water sources, has resulted in a shortage of fresh water in Waukesha, forcing the City to 
desperately seek water from the Great Lakes since 2010 (Mehta 2016).  
Approval was issued in 2016 by each of the Great Lakes states to pipe 8.2 million gallons of 
Lake Michigan water a day from Milwaukee and to return the treated wastewater to Lake 
Michigan through the Root River. However, controversy started growing as cities such as 
Thunder Bay and New Berlin objected to the approval, and this started a long period of debates 
on whether this and similar exceptions in water extraction should or should not be approved 





The Waukesha city experience demonstrates the high level of resistance in the Great Lakes’ 
Water Protectors to approve water extractions outside of the Great Lakes’ watersheds. The topic 
has been under controversial debate since 2010, with very slow progress towards resolution and 
final construction of the pipeline. Even as recent as August 2020 (after 10 years), authorities 
state that “nearly all of the state and federal permits have been issued”, which is a reflection of 
the many objections of some influential stakeholders (Simroth, 2020). Although issuing water 
extraction exceptions have been considered in agreements among Great Lakes’ stakeholders 
(Kane, 2017; Sheikh and Brougher, 2008), what has happened in reality reflects a situation in 
which permission issuance and water diversion simply does not occur. The very few diversions 
to outside of the Great Lakes watershed that have been happening since before the agreements 
came to existence (e.g. the Chicago diversion which has been implemented since 1848), have 
been seriously cut back to decrease the amount of diversions from the Great Lakes to less than 
one-third of the original diversion rate (Quinn and Edstrom, 2000). 
4.1.6. The Integrated Graph Model  
To illustrate a better perspective of the studied case, the integrated graph model of the conflict is 
developed by using Gephi (an open-source network analysis and visualization software package) 
(Figure 4.2).  
The graph model helps in illustrating a better sense of decisionmakers’ movements through the 
feasible states. The numbers shown at the nodes refer to the feasible states presented before. The 
arcs represent state transitions for each decisionmakers’ unilateral moves from one state to 







Figure 4-2. Integrated Graph Form * P: Water Protectors, S: Water Seekers Note: The relations 
between the arcs are all bidirectional. 
 
Although Figure 4.2 shows all movements (including improvements and disimprovements) for 
all decisionmakers; in reality, when transitioning from one node to the other, the decisionmakers 
consider their preferences and tend to move to more favorable states (i.e. unilateral 
improvements). Overall, the graph model gives a better sense of decisionmakers’ movements 
toward their preferred feasible states. 
4.2. Case II: Drinking Water Conflicts over Grand River  
Grand River is a major source of water pouring into Lake Erie. Although more than 60 percent of 
Grand River’s water is consumed through municipal usages, the rest of the water is used by other 
decisionmakers. Studying the below pie chart (Figure 4.3), helps in better understanding Grand 
River watershed’s water conflicts, especially when it is experiencing extended periods of lower 
rainfall and high temperatures which lowers surface water levels, aggravating water disputes. For 
example, water bottling companies have been criticized for their drinking water extraction from 





users are getting into more and more conflicts with the Regions, Cities and NGOs surrounding 
the Grand River.  
 
Figure 4.3. Major Water Uses in the Grand River Watershed (Etienne, 2014) 
 
The worsening of these water conflicts is taken seriously by decisionmakers in the watershed to 
the extent that the Region of Waterloo started working on a Master Plan which proposed drawing 
a pipeline from Great Lakes (Lake Huron or Lake Erie) as an alternative to other water sources 
already in use (Gombos, 2014). Although implementing this alternative has been deferred from 
the year 2035 to beyond 2050, it shows that the shared Grand River water source (Figure 4.4: 
Map of the Grand River Watershed) is vulnerable and requires intricate handling to remain a 






Figure 4.4. Map of the Grand River Watershed (WaterCanada, 2015)  
 
In sum, powerful and ambitious water bottling companies such as Nestle, the issuance of 





water-use in other industries (e.g. in Ontario farms for agricultural irrigation), and broader 
factors such as climate change, are variables which increase the rate of exhaustion of water 
sources in Ontario. Multiple governmental offices and NGOs which initiate various events, 
conferences, and other initiatives (e.g. the AquaHacking 2017 Challenge at University of 
Waterloo which attempts to develop functional, marketable ideas to solve Lake Erie’s water 
concerns), are decisionmakers in opposition with the previously mentioned stakeholders 
(University of Waterloo, 2020).  
Although water bottling companies such as Nestle try to encourage the use of bottled water, 
decisionmakers such as the Waterloo Region are promoting tap water, arguing that it is safe, 
since tap water undergoes more than 120 different water quality tests at Waterloo Region, 
contrary to bottled waters which are not mandated to meet the requirements for mineral or spring 
water set by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. It is also argued that tap water is much more 
environment-friendly since they do not produce any bottles/plastic waste, and also, they do not 
impose vehicle transportation costs and pollution related to transporting the product (water 
bottles) from where they have been bottled to retailers and final consumers. This decreases gas 
emissions from the transportation vehicles. Moreover, Municipalities and Regions in the Grand 
River watershed, advertise that tap water is cheaper. It costs the customer much less than one 
cent to a liter of tap water in the Region of Waterloo, but $2 per liter to buy water in the bottled 
form. Finally, it is argued that tap water is much more accessible and convenient compared to 
bottled water accessibility (Region of Waterloo, 2020b).  
The conflict between the two decisionmakers runs deep and each of the sides are taking actions 
to oppose the other decisionmaker in this escalating conflict. For example, the Region of 





Energy Efficiency Project (REEP) and The Grand River Conservation Authority (GRCA). This 
support is in the form of free well assessments (bacteriological testing) to help well owners keep 
their drinking water safe and healthy, without the need of buying bottled water from commercial 
businesses (Government of Canada, 2018). 
In another symbolic gesture against bottled water companies, Waterloo Region banned single use 
bottled water sales in public facilities in 2008. In line with the aforementioned banning, the City 
of Waterloo is encouraging private businesses and other types of institutions to be water-bottle 
friendly establishments (through the Blue Water program). This means that the institution would 
be openly inviting to everyone to come in and fill up their reusable water bottles with free tap 
water inside their facilities. The Water Wagon mobile drinking project is also another approach 
that the Region of Waterloo (like other Municipalities such as the City of Guelph) is taking to 
promote drinking water from municipal tap water over bottled water. Moreover, the Region of 
Waterloo subsidizes on the cost of 200-litre rain barrels to promote their usage in an attempt to 
save on water costs and decrease overall water demand whether it be drinking or other water 
usages (Region of Waterloo, 2020b).  
Other than the Waterloo Region, there are other types of institutions in Waterloo region that are 
also actively trying to decrease bottled water consumption through various methods. For 
example, an initiative at Wilfrid Laurier University, although unsuccessful, tried to stop the sales 
of water bottles on its campuses through the promotion of easily accessible filtered water-fill 
stations and other alternatives (Wilfrid Laurier University, 2020).  
These were some examples of disputes among opposing decisionmakers on water extraction or 





watershed). To showcase the complexity of water management dynamics in the Great Lakes’ 
watersheds, and to better introduce the GMCR method, the conflict between Nestle and the City 
of Guelph is discussed below. The City of Guelph has authority over water extraction permission 
issuance from the Grand River watershed. However, it is also responsible for conserving and 
maintaining water availability for the community. This added to business owners’ pressures to 
extract more water from the watershed, results in disputes over the topic.  
4.2.1. Causal Loop Diagram 
The below causal loops are developed for the two major decisionmakers in this section’s conflict 
(Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6). Although the City of Guelph has control over decisions such as 
issuing more permits for water extraction, it is also affected by external variables such as climate 
change and population growth. The more climate change effects become severe, the stricter the 
City will be in issuing new permits. And less permits mean less pressure on available water 
resources. Each of the variables below have a direct or indirect effect on other variables and on 




















Nestle’s causal loop (Figure 4.6) is more focused on reducing its costs, increasing its revenues, 
satisfying its customers, and expanding its business. And again, external variables such as 
climate change, population, competition, and new regulations affect this status quo. For example, 
more restricting regulations limits expansion efforts by Nestle. Or more population means more 
revenue for Nestle. 
Figure 4.6. Nestle’s System Dynamic Status Quo 
4.2.2. Decisionmakers’ Options  
For the sake of the current case study, and to develop a simpler and more sensible model, only 
two decisionmakers (City of Guelph and Nestle) and specific variables are focused on as the 





The possible options of each decisionmaker are determined. Four options in total for the 
decisionmakers are identified (two for each decisionmaker) (Table 4.10). These options are 
developed based on various sources (e.g. articles, interviews, and etc.). The four developed 
options represent the main decisions that each decisionmaker might make in the current conflict.   
Table 4.10: Case II Decisionmakers and Their Options 
City Options 
1 Permit for Privatization 
2 Tight Restrictions 
Nestle Options 
3 Water Export 
4 Distribute in National 
Level 
 
It seems that the City is considering two options for itself. The first is to issue more water 
extraction permits for different heavy water consumers including Nestle. In this situation, these 
consumers are given permits to withdraw more water from the available water resources in the 
region. Another option for the City would be to impose tight restrictions for heavy water 
consumers regarding not only water extraction, but also other issues such as water treatment after 
withdrawing water from the water resources and also before releasing the used water back into 
the water resources.  
An option for Nestle, as a water bottling company is to export the water it extracts from the 
region’s water resources. Exporting water from Canada, as a major freshwater resource, to other 
less resourceful countries (e.g. US), is an important strategy that Nestle is looking into in the 
long term. The other option that Nestle might choose, is to sell its bottled water in Canada more 
than before.  
State 1 is a condition in which none of the mentioned options is chosen by the two 





the ones that are already issued. Moreover, the City does not impose more restrictions. Nestle 
would also do what it has been doing. In other words, none of the two decisionmakers would 
change their strategies in this state. As another example, in state 16, the City would impose much 
more restrictions on water withdrawal and water treatment standards and other water extraction 
related issues. However, Nestle decides to export water and also, sell nationally, in spite of these 
tight restrictions. This means that Nestle would adapt itself to the challenging restrictions 
imposed by the City to expand its business nationally and internationally.   
The status quo (State 11) is shaded in the below table (Table 4.11). In this state, the City does not 
issue more permits, other than the ones that are already issued. Also, no more restrictions are 
imposed by the City. Nestle exports water and sells nationally. In the below table, “N” means 
that the option is chosen by the decisionmaker. And “Y” means that the option is chosen by the 
decisionmaker. 
Table 4.11: Case II States 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N 
2 N N Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y 
3 N N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y 
4 N N N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
 
4.2.3. Feasible and Infeasible States 
From the 16 possible states in the current case, only 12 of them are feasible or acceptable (Table 
4.12). For example, the City would not be able to choose option 1 (issuing more permits) and 





water treatment, and other issues) at the same time. Thus, states that have these two options 
(have a “Y” in option 1 and option 2), are infeasible (cannot happen in the real world) and are 
removed from the analysis. These infeasible states are highlighted in the table below.  
Table 4.12: Distinguishing Feasible and Infeasible States (shaded cells represent infeasible 
states) 
   States 
 
Options 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N 
2 N N Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y 
3 N N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y 
4 N N N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
 
The feasible states are now ready to be analyzed (Table 4.13). The status quo (State 10) is shaded 
in this table.  
Table 4.13: Feasible States 
   States 
 
Options 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N 
2 N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
3 N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 
4 N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
4.2.4. Decisionmakers’ Preferences 
Now that the feasible states are developed, decisionmakers’ preferences are ranked from the 
most preferred to the least preferred state for each decisionmaker. The below table shows 
preferences of the City of Guelph (Table 4.14). The City prefers not to issue more permits for 
heavy water consumers such as Nestle. It favors imposing restrictions to keep its control over the 
region’s water resources. However, it also favors exportation of water to other countries. This 





Therefore, although the states numbered 3 and 1 are the most preferred states for City of Guelph, 
state number 6 is also favored by the City. In this state, Nestle is exporting the extracted water 
with a tight control over it by the City. The least preferred state for the City is when it issues 
more permits for heavy water consumers, with no more restrictions. This is accompanied by 
water exportation and national distribution by Nestle.  
Table 4.14: City of Guelph Preferences (State Ranking) 
 
   States 
 
Options 
3 1 6 9 12 2 4 7 10 5 8 11 
1 N N N N N Y N N N Y Y Y 
2 Y N Y Y Y N N N N N N N 
3 N N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y 
4 N N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y 
 
The below table (Table 4.15) shows preferences of Nestle. As it can be seen, Nestle prefers state 
number 11 over other states. State 11 is a situation in which the City issues more permits for 
water extraction. And Nestle, taking advantage of City’s strategy, not only exports more water to 
other countries, but also sells its products nationally in Canada. This is regarded as the most 
preferred state for Nestle since in this state, Nestle is using all of its capacity in expanding its 
business across the globe and Canada.   
The next preferred state for Nestle is State 5. In this condition, permits for water withdrawal are 
issued more by the City and Nestle focuses immensely on exporting bottled water to other 
countries. This helps Nestle guarantee market shares worldwide. This is a more preferred state 
than state 8 in which the permits are issued by the City, but Nestle only expands nationally. 
Overall, Nestle is in favor of a situation in which it has City’s approval to expand, with less 





nationally in Canada. Based on the provided statement above, the least preferred state for Nestle 
is when there are many restrictions imposed by the City and Nestle changes nothing in its current 
strategy.  
Table 4.15: Nestle Preferences (State Ranking) 
 
   States 
 
Options 
11 5 8 10 2 4 7 12 6 9 1 3 
1 Y Y Y N Y N N N N N N N 
2 N N N N N N N Y Y Y N Y 
3 Y Y N Y N Y N Y Y N N N 
4 Y N Y Y N N Y Y N Y N N 
 
4.2.5. Stability Analysis 
In the next step of the graph model technique, stability analysis using previously introduced 
solution concepts (Table 3.1) that describe decisionmakers’ strategic interactions are applied to 
every outcome in the conflict model.  
Table 4.16: Case II Decisionmakers’ Preferences and Stability Analysis  
City of Guelph 
Overall 
Stability 
X X X X E X X X X X X X 
Decisionmaker 
Stability 
R S R R R U U U U U U U 
Preference 
Vector 




   
3 6 9 12 6 9 12      
1 
  




R S S R U S S R U U U U 
Preference 
Vector 












6 4 6     
8 
     
7 9 
* E: Equilibrium, R: Rational, S: Sequentially sanctioned, U: Unstable for a particular decisionmaker, X: 





As can be seen in the Tableau Form (Fraser and Hipel, 1979; Fraser and Hipel, 1984) (Table 
4.16), state 12 is the equilibrium state for this conflict. In this state, the City does not increase the 
number of permits for privatization. Moreover, it pushes for regulating the industry with 
increasingly tight restrictions. Nestle tries to adapt to these restrictions and starts exporting under 
the new regulations. It also increases its national distribution in Canada, under the new 
restrictions in an attempt to expand its business. 
To understand why State 12 becomes the final equilibrium state in this conflict, a few unilateral 
improvements would be described. For example, consider a situation in which the conflict is in 
State 3, which is the most preferred state for the City of Guelph. In this situation, the City does 
not allow for more water extraction, and tight water extraction and treatment regulations also 
exist. In State 3, Nestle is neither exporting water, nor expanding nationally in Canada. However, 
since State 12 is more preferred than State 3 for Nestle, and that it can unilaterally improve to 
State 12 without the involvement of City of Guelph. Therefore, the conflict would not be stable 
in State 3, even though the City of Guelph prefers that it stays there. Also, if the conflict is in 
State 11, Nestle is exporting water internationally, and is also expanding its business nationally. 
And the City of Guelph lets Nestle do this, without limiting permission issuance. As mentioned 
before, this state (State 11) is the most preferred state for Nestle. However, in this situation, the 
City of Guelph can unilaterally improve to State 12, since this state is more preferred for the City 
of Guelph as compared to State 11. So, even if Nestle is not on board with the conflict 
transitioning from State 11 to State 12, this issue will happen because the City of Guelph can 





Similar to the two examples provided above, this trend of independent unilateral moves from 
both sides of the conflict happens in all the feasible states of this conflict. And in all scenarios, 
the conflict ends up in State 12, the equilibrium state.  
This ending up of the conflict in State 12, is also reflected in reality. In the past years, Nestle has 
been exporting water from the Great Lakes watersheds in single use plastic bottles to be sold 
across Canada and other parts of North America. The Province of Ontario and the City of Guelph 
have come to defend Nestle’s business in many circumstances (e.g. City of Guelph, 2020). 
However, the trend of the conflict shows that it is slowly transitioning towards State 12, in which 
the City of Guelph is being convinced by the community and the many NGOs opposing Nestle’s 
water extraction operations, to reject further Nestle renewal applications.  
NGOs have been fighting Nestle fiercely in the past few years. Some have continuously 
expressed their contention and concern about limited future availability of water for the 
community (Khan, 2020; Rubin, 2020), while others simply oppose the huge profit Nestle is 
making through extracting and exporting water from the watershed (Boucher, 2016; 
GuelphToday, 2018). 
The relentless community pressures on the City to put a hold onto further water extraction 
approvals for water bottling companies such as Nestle, has proved to be working based on 
the City’s statements, which show that authorities are also getting more and more 
conservative about issuing approval renewals. As an example, in the City’s 2016 report 
regarding this matter (City of Guelph, 2016), it has been mentioned that “'there are limits to the 
available groundwater to satisfy Guelph's future water supply needs” (CBC, 2016), and “as such, 





needs of the community, the potential risk that available supply may not meet future 
demand and that the continued water takings may not be sustainable wi thout proper 
management of the resource” (Hallett, 2016). These statements, after all the ongoing 
demands from the community pushing for a change in the permission issuance regulations, 
is a clear indicator that the conflict between water bottling companies such as Nestle and the 
authorities will soon be transitioning to State 12, in which tighter regulations will be 








Chapter 5 Application of the Proposed Framework 
Now that we have gone through the GMCR method through relevant examples, and also, gained 
knowledge of the various conflicts surrounding water resources in the Great Lakes regions, we 
can proceed with a complete application of the previously proposed framework in this thesis 
(Section 3.2. Methodology used for this Thesis). A central conflict over time in the Great Lakes 
watershed has been around algae in Lake Erie. Evolving through the decades, this conflict is 
analyzed through two full cycles of the methodology outlined in Figure 3.4, and insights in 
potential future related conflict avoidance or resolution are offered based on this analysis.  
5.1. Rising Phosphorous Levels in Lake Erie 
Lake Erie has a surface area of 25,700 square kilometres, and an average depth of only 19 metres 
(Thames River Phosphorus Reduction Collaborative, 2018). Among the Great Lakes, Lake Erie 
is the shallowest in depth, smallest by volume, and warmest in temperature. It also has the most 
densely populated watershed.  






The Canadian side of Lake Erie supports 2.68 million people, 53 per cent of them in eight urban 
areas (i.e., populations over 50,000) and the rest in smaller towns and rural areas. Agricultural 
production accounts for about three-quarters (75%) of the land use on the Canadian side of the 
basin. Urban centres, settlements and roads make up 12 per cent of land area, with natural areas 
accounting for another 13 per cent (Government of Canada, 2018).  
Lake Erie not only is a source of drinking water for municipal residents, but also brings various 
commercial and recreational opportunities for the region. It is the most biologically diverse and 
productive of the Great Lakes because of its shallow depth and warm temperatures. It is home to 
more than 130 fish species, some of which (like Walleye and Yellow Perch) support large 
commercial and recreational fisheries. It is an important food, spawning, nursery and refuge 
habitat for aquatic and terrestrial species) as well (Government of Canada, 2018).  






A lot of water sources eventually pour into Lake Erie such as Thames River, which flows into 
Lake St. Clair, the Grand River, which flows into the eastern basin, the Sydenham River, which 
discharges to Lake St. Clair, and Kettle and Big Otter Creeks, which discharge to the central 
basin (Figure 5.2). Discharges from Lake Superior, Lake Michigan, and Lake Huron also drain 
into Lake Erie through the Detroit River (Government of Canada, 2018). 
Lake Erie has been facing serious challenges. For example, Algae (or Algal) blooms and zones 
of low oxygen have been increasing in Lake Erie over the past decade (TidesCanada, 2015). The 
root of the problem is excess phosphorus entering Lake Erie from multiple sources.  
Some of these sources can be specifically located, since they are diffused from a certain point. 
These are called point source phosphorous pollution. They discharge from sources such as 
industrial treatment plants, livestock farms, and municipal sewage treatment outlets. The other 
type of phosphorus pollutions originates from non-point sources. Rainfall and snowmelt start 
moving over and through grounds, picking up phosphorous and other types of pollutants on the 
way. They finally pour into lakes and rivers, increasing pollutant levels in them. The 
phosphorous in non-point sources are usually picked up from agricultural land fertilizers, and 
runoffs from industrial and urban landscapes (e.g. faulty septic systems, pet waste, and lawn 
fertilization). When rainfalls or the melting snow are in the form of storm water, they carry much 
more pollutants into the rivers or lakes (EPA, 2020).  
Physical characteristics and human activities in Lake Erie’s watershed make it the most reactive 
of the Great Lakes to weather changes and thus, phosphorus inputs (Shin, 2013). A lot of the 
pollution that gets into Lake Erie comes from rivers flowing into Lake Erie, including the Grand 





Excess phosphorous and in turn, increased algal blooms significantly increase water treatment 
costs, especially for municipal drinking water systems and industrial manufacturers, including 
food processing and bottled water companies. Moreover, algal blooms impose increased health 
care costs due to exposure to the pollutants. Also, the food web structure and ecosystem 
functioning are altered, negatively affecting recreational and commercial fisheries (Shin, 2013). 
All of these would reduce property values due to loss of recreational opportunities. Another 
consequence would be reduced tourism revenue due to beach closures.  
All of this costs the Canadian Lake Erie basin economy at least $272 million annually. The 
economic loss to the commercial fishery as a result of these changes could exceed $100 million 
over the next 25 years. As another example of the financial consequences, the lack of water for 
just five days in mid-July, due to a shutdown of municipal water supply in an area, is enough to 
result in a loss of crops and $290 million in total revenue from local greenhouse operations 
(Government of Canada, 2018). 
As a brief timeline, the problem was discovered as a serious risk to the health of the people and 
ecosystem in the 1960s. It was in 1968 in which phosphorus loadings reached a peak of 
approximately 28,000 tonnes per year (Government of Canada, 2018).  
In the 1970s, Canada, Ontario and the U.S. invested billions of dollars in point source pollution 
control, especially wastewater treatment plant upgrades. In 1972, the International Joint 
Commission (IJC) established the Pollution from Land Use Activities Reference Group 
(PLUARG) to investigate the impact of land-based activities on pollutant loadings (International 
Joint Commission, 2020). It was in the 70s in which both US and Canadian governments 





phosphorous entering Lake Erie from the Canadian side was reduced by 82% (Government of 
Canada, 2018).  
A main action which contributed to this major decrease in phosphorous levels was significantly 
investing in renovating sewage systems to enhance treatment capacity of the returning waters to 
the rivers and Lake Erie (Government of Canada, 2018).  
By the mid 1980s, phosphorus loadings to Lake Erie were less than half the levels of the early 
1970s and thus, the frequency and extent of nuisance and harmful algal blooms had declined 
considerably. In 1989 another legislation (under Canada Water Act and Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (CEPA)) was passed to further limit phosphorus concentrations in household 
detergents (Government of Canada, 2018).  







In the early 1990s, the average annual phosphorus load was approximately 10,000 tonnes. 
However, in the mid 1990s, total phosphorus loadings started rising due to population growth, 
increased sewage, and more agricultural land use (deforestation).  
Moreover, innovations in agricultural technology and fertilizer production after the Second 
World War, allowed the expansion of hybrid corn production and increased application of 
commercial fertilizers (Government of Canada, 2018).   
There have been many ups and downs in the phosphorous levels from then. The year 2011 was 
one of the worst among the recent previous years. This was a reason for which since 2012, more 
than $30 million has been granted to fund more than 8,350 projects in Lake Erie watersheds. On 
June 13, 2015, Ontario signed the Western Basin of Lake Erie Collaborative Agreement with the 
U.S. states of Michigan and Ohio. Based on this agreement and other initiatives, these 
governments committed to 40 per cent total load reduction in the amount of total and dissolved 
reactive phosphorus entering Lake Erie’s western basin by 2025, with an aspirational interim 
goal of a 20 percent reduction by 2020 (from 2008 base year). Funding for the programs has 
been the result of many institutions, including Grand River Conservation Authorities’ (GRCA) 
effort to leverage local funds and partnerships with municipal, provincial and federal funding 
(Government of Canada, 2018). 
In sum, Canada, Ontario, the United States and many partners have worked together to reduce 
phosphorus loadings to Lake Erie for more than 40 years, resulting in significant improvements 
through the 1970s and 1980s. However, a warming climate, changes in land use and 
management, and increasing population, have all contributed to a resurgence of algal blooms and 





sources of phosphorus and other pollutants (such as artificial sweeteners in the recent years) 
entering Lake Erie, immediate and collective action by governments, sectors and communities is 
needed. 
Although some of the phosphorous in Lake Erie is due to direct inputs from sources into Lake 
Erie, much of the phosphorous in Lake Erie comes from rivers flowing into it. And thus, those 
rivers and their watersheds become increasingly important in maintaining a clean lake. For 
example, Ontario’s Grand River with 70% farming land in its watershed, has one of highest 
levels of phosphorous and artificial sweetener (a tracer for human wastewater), which all pour 
into Lake Erie. Neighbouring Cities such as Waterloo, Kitchener, Cambridge, and Brantford 
have more than 30 treatment plants which pour into Grand River, ultimately affecting 
phosphorous levels and other toxins in Lake Erie (Government of Canada, 2018).  
As mentioned previously, Lake Erie’s phosphorous concern has been in the center of attention 
several times. For this reason, and as an example of an ongoing conflict in a long period of time, 
it is investigated in this thesis. Two points in time are chosen to be analyzed. Initially, the topic is 
studied when it first became a concern in late 1960s to early 1970s. And, the second analysis 
focuses on the current situation. 
5.2. 1970s 
5.2.1. Causal Loop Diagram  
Initially, the status of the stakeholders is investigated through the causal loops approach. In this 
phase, the different variables of the situation are depicted, and their relationships are analyzed to 





As an example of a negative loop in the diagram, when Algae Bloom levels increased in late 
1960s, the water quality was affected extensively, and this raised a lot of social attention and 
resulted in media speculation that Lake Erie might be “dead” (Government of Canada, 2018). 
This triggered government initiatives and approved funding to conduct sewage systems 
renovations followed by more sewage treatment, and reduced phosphorous, and thus, less algal 
bloom levels in Lake Erie. Each of the other loops in the following diagram can be interpreted in 
a similar manner.  
 
Figure 5.4. 1970s Initial Causal Loop Diagram 
Another important happening in the 1970s was that after the increase in algae blooms, fisheries 





setting stricter regulations to pressure businesses to decrease their use of phosphorous. For 
example, businesses who produced phosphorous-based products such as detergents, and 
fertilizers, had to change their ways of production. And this would have resulted in a huge 
decrease of phosphorous levels poured into Lake Erie. 
Although studying this initial causal loop helps in understanding the situation, the GMCR model 
provides much more insight into the conflict at a point in time, since it focuses on the 
stakeholders, and through a rigorous analytical approach, it reveals a systematic perspective of 
the situation.  
5.2.2. Decisionmakers’ Options 
Based on a thorough literature review of the situation, it is apparent that the society as a whole 
became well aware of Lake Erie’s soaring pollution levels and the urgent need to handle the 
crisis back in 1970s. This consensus on the existence and urgency of the topic, brought together 
many of the important decisionmakers in the system to spend time on the different approaches 
they could take to deal with the issue.  
The authorities were one group of decisionmakers which had the required power to do something 
about the huge amounts of phosphorous pouring into the Erie Lake. After thorough 
investigations of the situation, they came up with two possible options to approach the crisis. 
One was to heavily invest in renewing sewage system infrastructures to lessen point source 
pollution, originating from tons of phosphorous pouring directly into Lake Erie. The other option 
was to go back one step, and strictly regulate water management processes to prevent more 





Through the investigations, it also became clear then that a main contributor to point source 
pollution of Lake Erie were businesses and they had to be on board with the authorities, for the 
crisis management initiative to work more effectively. Therefore, businesses are considered as 
the second main decisionmaker in this system. Since there were no restrictions set yet for 
regulating businesses to do anything on this issue, businesses had the option to voluntarily work 
with the officials on this initiative or not to take part in it.  
The possible options of each decisionmaker have been inputted into the below table (Table 5.1) 
(all GMCRII phases for this set of analysis are shown in Appendix D). Three options are 
considered for the decisionmakers in this conflict.  
Table 5.1. 1970s Decisionmakers and Their Options 
Authorities  
1 Regulate Water Usage and Treatment Standards 
2 Increase Budget for Sewage Systems Renovations 
Businesses 3 Optimize Phosphorous Usage  
  
5.2.3. Feasible and Infeasible States 
Each of the three options can be chosen or not by the decisionmakers. The combinations of 
decisionmakers’ decisions (chosen options) develop different states. Therefore, the three options 
in the current conflict, produce eight (8) states which represent the combinations of the options 
that might occur. Each state refers to a combination of decisions that could be chosen by the 
decisionmakers. In Table 5.2, “N” means that the option is not chosen by the decisionmaker. 
And “Y”, means that the option is chosen by the decisionmaker. 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 N Y N Y N Y N Y 
2 N N Y Y N N Y Y 





For example, the status quo (the initial condition before the decisionmakers took action) is State 
1 in which there were no regulations set by the authorities yet. And the governments were not yet 
investing in renovating the infrastructure of the sewage systems. And the businesses were not 
concerned with optimizing their manufacture or usage of phosphorous-based detergents, 
fertilizers, or other products that much.   
There were no infeasible states among the current case’s states and all were feasible to occur (the 
detailed descriptions of all the states are provided in the next section). 
5.2.4. Decisionmakers’ Preferences 
Now, decisionmakers’ preferences are ranked from the most preferred to the least preferred state 
for each decisionmaker (Table 5.3 and Table 5.5). 




7 8 5 3 4 6 2 1 
1 N Y N N Y Y Y N 
2 Y Y N Y Y N N N 
3 Y Y Y N N Y N N 
 
A major preference for the Authorities is that without them going through the long process of 
developing regulations, the businesses voluntarily optimize their usage levels. However, the 
Authorities were fine with increasing budget levels to help Cities and businesses in these 
phosphorous-decreasing activities (i.e. State 7). The Authorities did not however, prefer states in 
which businesses did not optimize their usage levels. Descriptions of the above states are 










Descriptions of Authorities’ Preferences 
7 The main problem identified back in 1970s was to control point 
sources to ideally prevent or substantially decrease Phosphorus 
pouring into Lake Erie. Therefore, increasing budget for sewage 
systems renovations was the first task Authorities had in mind. And 
thus, it is identified as an initially preferred option. However, 
regulating water treatment standards is time consuming and costly for 
Authorities, therefore, the ideal resolution is that Businesses 
voluntarily show an effort to reach the goal of phosphorus 
reduction/elimination. 
8 Since Option 2, which is increasing renovations budget, is a first 
priority for the Authorities, and at the same time, Option 3 is 
important for them as well, State 8 is the next preference for 
Authorities. It depicts a situation in which for the sake of achieving 
the objectives, Authorities are ready to design new regulations, in 
case voluntary conforming of the Businesses is not enough or doesn’t 
work.  
5 Option 2, which is increasing renovations budget, is not taken by 
Authorities in this State (Option 2 is “N”). In this state (State 5), 
awareness among Businesses is very high to the extent that they 
prefer to voluntary take action. 
3 Authorities prefer to assign budget. This State is preferred even if the 
Businesses don’t act voluntarily. 
4 Since assigning budget is an obvious mission for Authorities, State 4 





6 Although the main problem is the old sewage system and point 
sources, Option 2 is not taken in this state. 
2 The only action is setting up regulations, which is less preferred for 
Authorities because this would be a very short-term solution. 
1 Due to serious consequences of phosphorous excess (health, safety, 
and economic consequences), doing nothing is the least preferred 
state among all. 
 
Businesses preferences are shown in the below table (Table 5.5). 




3 8 6 7 1 5 4 2 
1 N Y Y N N N Y Y 
2 Y Y N Y N N Y N 
3 N Y Y Y N Y N N 
 
Businesses prefer State 3 the most, in which they would not be forced to abide by the regulations 
set for optimizing usage levels. Descriptions of the above states are discussed in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6. Descriptions of Businesses’ Preferences   
 
State 
Descriptions of Businesses’ Preferences 
3 Taking care of point source pollution has become a public request 
and therefore, the Authorities have decided to assign enough 
budget to renovate old sewage systems (Option 2 is selected by the 
Authorities). However, in State 3 which is the most preferred state 
for the Businesses, Option 3 is not selected, meaning that they are 






8 The budget is increased by the Authorities, and the regulations are 
strict. In this case, Businesses are committed to optimizing their 
phosphorous usage. State 8 is the second preference for 
Businesses, in which the relationship among stakeholders is mostly 
based on cooperation.  
6 The budget is not increased, yet all stakeholders have agreed to 
cooperate. Businesses have reached to the conclusion that they 
need to optimize phosphorus usage. 
7 Although Authorities only increase the budget and do not take 
Option 1, Businesses are willing to cooperate.  
1 None of the options are chosen by stakeholders. These kinds of 
states are usually transitional states. Which means, decisionmakers 
are in the process of making decisions or taking actions. 
5 Cooperation is the favorable option chosen by Businesses. 
However, not taking any options by Authorities is not preferred by 
Businesses.  
4 It is not preferred by Businesses to do nothing, while Authorities 
increase budget and implement stricter regulations. This can cause 
the conflicts to get more serious.   
2 Only Option 1 is selected in this state. This means increased 
regulation by Authorities, and no other actions taken. This state is 
not something Businesses prefer.  
 
5.2.5. Stability Analysis 
As mentioned in the previous cases, stability analysis using logical rules (i.e. solution concepts; 





the conflict model in the Tableau Form (Fraser and Hipel, 1979; Fraser and Hipel, 1984) (Table 
5.7).  
As an example, if the Authorities improve from State 8 to State 7, there is a probability that the 
Businesses unilaterally improve to State 3 (a less preferred state than State 8 for Authorities). In 
these situations, it is rational for both decisionmakers to stay at their current state rather than 
unilaterally improve to begin with. Therefore, State 8 is considered to be sequentially sanctioned 
for Authorities. In Table 5.7, sequentially sanctioned states for each of the decisionmakers are 
shown by “S”. 
States indicated by “U” in Table 5.7 represent unstable states for a particular decisionmaker. In 
these states, the decisionmaker has the opportunity to improve to another state. For example, the 
Businesses can improve from State 5 to State 1. In this case, there is a probability that Authorities 
move to State 3, which is more preferred for Businesses. Therefore, State 5 is considered as an 
unstable state for the Businesses. 




X E X E X X X X 
Decisionmaker 
Stability 
R S S R U U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
7 8 5 3 4 6 2 1 
UIs  7 7  3 8 4 3 




R R R U R U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
3 8 6 7 1 5 4 2 
UIs    3  1 8 6 
 
* E: Equilibrium, R: Rational, S: Sequentially sanctioned, U: Unstable for a particular decisionmaker, X: Unstable 





After identifying the stability of individual states for each decisionmaker, equilibrium states 
which are stable states for all the decisionmakers are identified. These states are shown by “E” in 
Table 5.7 and are states in which there is overall stability among the decisionmakers. This is a 
situation where the decisionmakers have transitioned to other states a few times, and they have 
reached to an equilibrium which is rational for all decisionmakers, meaning that everyone is 
stable and cannot unilaterally improve to another state. The remaining states that are indicated by 
“X” represent states that are unstable for at least one decisionmaker. 
State 3 and 8 are stable for both the Businesses and the Authorities while the other states are 
stable under some but not all solution concepts. Therefore, these two states are considered as the 
equilibrium, which are also reflected in reality. In State 3, regulations were not implemented 
since they required a lot of time to be developed and enforced. They only came to effect after 
1989. However, the Authorities did assign a lot of budget to renew sewage systems to decrease 
point source pollution pouting into the Lake. And finally, Businesses did not voluntarily accept 
to lessen their use of phosphorous in their operations. This was what happened in the short term. 
However, in the long term, State 8 occurred in which all the three options happened. Not only 
regulations were developed, and budget was increased, but also businesses optimized their 
phosphorous usage rates, although not completely voluntarily. 
5.2.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
The Graph Model, similar to any research model, is an abstract representation of reality. As 
mentioned before, views of the researcher, or other factors such as the primary and secondary 





To decrease the subjectivity of the model, or in other words, assess the robustness of the 
proposed model, sensitivity analysis is implemented. In sensitivity analysis, the dynamics of the 
conflict is changed by asking “what-if” questions. This can be done through reasonable changes 
in the preference ranking of the main decisionmakers of the conflict. The preferences of the 
decisionmakers are modified based on logical interpretations of the real world existing 
conditions, and then, if the model yields to similar results to the previously obtained equilibria, it 
is understood that the model is robust enough to be used in the research. This validates the results 
from the original model. Alternatively, if the equilibria of the changed model are drastically 
different from the initial model’s results, it shows that the model’s original setup requires more 
thought and calibration.  
To conduct a sensitivity analysis for the current case, modifications are implemented on the 
Authorities preferences (Table 5.8). As can be seen in Table 5.9, the Businesses preference list 
was not modified in this sensitivity analysis scenario.  




5 7 6 8 3 2 4 1 
1 N N Y Y N Y Y N 
2 N Y N Y Y N Y N 
3 Y Y Y Y N N N N 
 
As mentioned previously, the Authorities understood the importance of eliminating point source 
pollution in Lake Erie. And one of the main contributors to this pollution, were Businesses. 
Therefore, in the alternative scenario, it is assumed that the Authorities most preferred States are 
those in which Businesses voluntarily act upon decreasing their contribution to point source 
pollution (Option 3 is selected). This brings up States 5, 7, 6, and 8 in the Authorities preference 





Businesses voluntarily and actively cooperate to resolve Lake Erie’s phosphorous concern (State 
5).  
The other states are ranked assuming that the Authorities would intervene in the process as less 
as possible. In the first phase they would be fine with assigning more budget to help businesses 
tackle the problem (State 7). And in the second phase, they would start regulating the industry 
(State 6). And lastly, and less preferred of course, they would do both (State 8). This trend stands 
even when the Businesses are voluntarily cooperating to eliminate point source pollution. 
However, the least preferred state for the Authorities would be to do nothing, in parallel to the 
Businesses doing nothing as well. This is not at all preferred, since the pollution concern would 
not be resolved when no one does nothing, and this situation was is not considered at all.  
Stability analysis resulting from the above alternative model is summarized in the Tableau Form 
(Fraser and Hipel, 1979; Fraser and Hipel, 1984) (Table 5.9).  




X X X X E X X X 
Decisionmaker 
Stability 
R S U U R U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
5 7 6 8 3 2 4 1 
UIs  5 7 6  3 2 4 
    5   7    3 2 




R R R U R U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
3 8 6 7 1 5 4 2 
UIs    3  1 8 6 
* E: Equilibrium, R: Rational, S: Sequentially sanctioned, U: Unstable for a particular decisionmaker, X: Unstable 





In this alternative scenario, State 3 became the stable for both Businesses and Authorities. This 
indicates that the initial model proposed seems to be fairly robust and reliable.  
5.2.7. Changes in the System from 1970s to 2010s 
As mentioned in Section 3.2 (Methodology used for this Thesis) and Figure 3.4 (Phases of the 
Currently Used Methodology), now that GMCR is applied on the case, an analysis is conducted 
on the system’s internal and external factors (through the use of the PESTLE model) to 
understand the changes which happened between 1970s to 2010s.  
In the 1970s, the stakeholders were aware to some extent of the non-point source phosphorous 
pollutions as well as the point source pollutions (Government of Canada, 2018).  
 
Figure 5.5. Point and Non-Point Source Phosphorous Pollution 
However, the focus of the initiatives became centered on eliminating point source phosphorous 





priority. Acting against point source pollution was much more straightforward compared to 
figuring out initiatives to eliminate non-point source pollution. This was the reason that 
Authorities decided to invest in extensive sewage system upgrades, which led to a tremendous 
success in decreasing phosphorous levels in Lake Erie. 
The other route which was considered to be effective, was to regulate water usage and treatment. 
However, this was a  solution which would not have resulted in immediate decrease of pollution 
levels. Since regulating was a time consuming approach, and the threats of the pollution were 
high, Authorities hoped for businesses to voluntarily take action and decrease high phosphorous 
levels in their products or their operations. However, this was not something that happened, since 
businesses were not eager to invest money, time, and effort on a non-enforced initiative. This 
was the overall picture of the conflict after the phosphorous pollution peak of 1970s.  
On another note, the external environment has a huge effect on ongoing conflicts among the 
stakeholders. These external variables affect, and are affected by the stakeholders, but cannot be 
controlled by them. For example, flooding, changes in the higher political ranks of the country, a 
national economic recession, unprecedented population growth, are all external variables which 
negatively or positively affect all the stakeholders such as the government, businesses, and 
NGOs, but yet, none of these decisionmakers can prevent them from happening.  
These external variables change the dynamics of the relationships in a conflict, especially when 
they occur instantly, and act as a shock to the system. In these instances, the stakeholders are not 
prepared for the occurrence, and their status in the system changes suddenly. This might raise 
even more conflicts among the stakeholders, since they are suddenly confronted by more issues 





After the 1970s, many external changes came to effect, which transformed the situation. For 
example, increase in the population (i.e. a social/demographic variable) due to immigration, 
migration, and birth rates in the past decades has been a huge factor in changing the dynamics of 
the water management system surrounding the Great Lakes, especially Lake Erie, which has one 
of the most populated watersheds. The increased population use more water, and produce more 
sewage, which necessitates additional treatment and infrastructure construction and maintenance. 
The additional water consumption, and the required infrastructure to effectively and efficiently 
provide safe water for this populated area, is a huge responsibility for relevant governments, and 
thus, their preferences would lean more towards having more authority and budget to handle the 
situation better.  
The other external factor which hugely affected and is still affecting the situation, is climate 
change (i.e. an environmental variable). The number of floods hitting the region has increased 
dramatically in the recent decades, which has increased runoff of non-treated water pouring into 
rivers that end up in Lake Erie. These act as nonpoint sources of pollution, creating more algae 
blooms in Lake Erie, which translates into more pressure on businesses and governments to 
clean their required water (Williams, 2019).  
In line with the climate change effects, the temperature in Lake Erie has been changing since 
1970. For example, as shown below, Lake Erie temperatures in 2019 have been lower (colder) in 
Winter, and higher (warmer) in Summers, compared to the past 20 years (NOAA - CoastWatch, 
2020). Moreover, precipitation data below shows that June and October precipitation have an 
increasing trend since 1950, while September and November precipitation have a decreasing 
trend in the last 2 to 3 decades. Since the 1970s, high annual rates of precipitation have been 





Corps of Engineers, 2020). Having the previous information in mind, droughts and floods are 
occurring more nowadays. Droughts make Lake Erie more polluted, since temperature is high 
and algae blooms grow more. Moreover, floods make the runoffs increase in volume, which 
results in more pollution of Lake Erie.  
Another external variable to the conflict, is the Great Lakes region’s financial status (i.e. an 
economic variable), which is showing a faster growth level than the Canadian economy. The two 
Canadian provinces and eight U.S. states surrounding the Great Lakes experienced a combined 
GDP of about $6 trillion USD in 2016. This number was around 5.8 trillion USD in 2015. An 
interesting fact is that the assuming the Great Lakes region was a country, it would have been the 
third largest economy in the world, after the U.S. and China (Figure 5.6). This increases the 
region’s ability to focus more investments in water management infrastructure.  






5.3. 2010s  
5.3.1. Causal Loop Diagram 
Now, we get into analyzing the conflict over the same issue (i.e. rising phosphorous levels in 
Lake Erie), which was intensified in the 2010s again. The causal loop diagram for the 2010s is 
provided in the below figure (Figure 5.7).  
 





5.3.2. Decisionmakers’ Options 
Between the two conflict settings in 1970s and 2010s, various changes occurred which 
transformed the dynamics of the system. One major change was the decision-making weight or 
importance of the stakeholders involved in the conflict.  
As mentioned in the 1970s setting, governments at all levels came to a similar conclusion that 
Lake Erie is in a critically polluted situation, and that point source pollution needs to be urgently 
addressed. These decisionmakers also agreed that providing budget will help quickly alleviate 
the crisis to a high extent, by renovating sewage infrastructure. Moreover, they understood the 
importance of regulating water management standards, to set strict guidelines for water 
treatment, distribution, and usage, which guaranteed less pollution pouring into Lake Erie. The 
clarity established through investigations and reports regarding point source pollution (especially 
the ancient drainage system), the required budget, and the need for regulations, developed a 
consensus among governmental stakeholders to join forces and tackle the crisis together.  
However, for all their initiatives to work, they also required the support of businesses to lower 
the amount of phosphorous flowing into sewage systems. Products such as detergents were found 
to be an important phosphorous source, acting as a major point source pollution. Therefore, in 
addition to the governmental decisionmakers, businesses were considered an important 
stakeholder in resolving the issue in the 1970s.  
However, as time passed, businesses became less important to the point that they cannot be 
considered as a main decisionmaker anymore. In the 1970s, eliminating point source pollution 
was the main focus of the governmental decisionmakers. They tried to convince businesses to 





The Authorities then started to set strict regulations to force businesses to abide by the 
enhancement standards, and these regulations came to effect later on in the late 1980s. After the 
regulations were set up, businesses had to follow the rules, and this was not optional anymore. 
This decreased the importance of businesses’ decisions in this conflict and changed the dynamics 
of the system.   
Moreover, in time, because of the growing complexity in governing cities, and bigger regions, 
the different levels of authority got divided in their preferences and options. The issue stems 
from the fact that each level of governmental authority gets assigned different responsibilities by 
the law, and this requires different, and sometimes opposing types of action.  
As an example, currently, regional and/or local governments (Regions and/or Municipalities) are 
in charge of sourcing quality water for the society, however it is the federal and/or provincial 
governments which are approving the budget for it. Or as mentioned before, in some cases, the 
Region provides the water to Municipalities, which finally sell the water to end users. But it is in 
these interactions between different levels of authority, in which disputes appear. Conflicts on 
regulation setting, budgeting, or implementation, are some of the disputes which might occur. 
So, the main stakeholders in this new setting are governmental authorities. However, these 
authorities have different options and preferences because of their position in the governmental 
hierarchy. After extensive data collection which occurred through primary and secondary data 
gathering procedures, the following options were extracted from the dynamics of the system 







Table 5.10 2010s Decisionmakers and Their Options 
Regulators 
1 Delegating Power to Local Governments 
for Policy Making and Regulation 
Development 
2 Providing Budget for Renewing Pipelines, 
Sewage Systems Renovations, Enhanced 
Drinking Water Treatment 
3 Development of Auditing Initiatives to 
Monitor Policy Implementation 
Implementers 
4 Seeking Authority Over Policy Making 
and Regulation Development  
5 Lobbying for Increased Budget 
 
As shown in the table, governmental authorities are divided into two main levels. Regulators are 
considered as high-level authorities which have the regulating power and can also increase or 
decrease the given budget to local governments such as Cities. They also have the option to audit 
the activities implemented by the local governments regarding maintaining Lake Erie. The local 
governments are titled as Implementers, since they have to conduct the policies set by the higher 
level federal and provincial governments. They prefer however, to develop those policies 
themselves instead of the higher-level governments. They also seek more budget to implement 
the set regulations.  
5.3.3. Feasible and Infeasible States 
The five options in the current conflict, produce thirty two (32) states which represent the 
combinations of the options that might occur (Table 5.11). Infeasible states in the current case 
are shaded in this table. In Table 5.11, “N” means that the option is not chosen by the 
decisionmaker. And “Y” means that the option is chosen by the decisionmaker.  
As mentioned before, some of the above states have mutuallly exclusive options and thus, are 
deemed infeasible to occur. For example, Option 1 is a situation in which the Regulators have 





Option 4 is a situation in which the Implementers are trying to have more authority over 
regulation development. So, Options 1 and 4 are mutually exclusive, meaning that they cannot 
happen at them same time. This restriction, elimnates States 9, 17, 20, 22, 28, 29, 31, and 32 
from the model.  
The same logic, applies to Options 2 and 5. In Option 2, the Regulators have already provided 
enough budget for renewing pipelines, sewage systems renovations, and enhanced drinking 
water treatment. And Option 5 is a situation in which the Implementers are lobbying for 
increased budget. However, there is no logical reason for Implementers to lobby for more 
budget, when the Regulators have already accepted to provide enough budget. Therefore, 
Options 2 and 5 are mutually exclusive options, and whichever state that has these two options 
selected in them, are considered infeasible to occur and are eliminated from the model. These 
states are 13, 19, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, and 32. After deleting the 14 infeasible states, the remaining 













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
1 N Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
2 N N Y N N N Y N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y 
3 N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
4 N N N N Y N N N Y N N Y N Y N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 









The feasible states are shown below (Table 5.12). State 17 is the status quo (shaded in Table 
5.12), in which the Regulators are not increasing regulations and budget for initiatives regarding 
Lake Erie anymore. And they have not got into increasingly auditing lower level governments 
and also businesses regarding their implementation of policies. It is understood that these occur 
even now, however, these options are intended to show increases in regulations, budget, and 
audit levels compared to the current situation. In State 17, the Implementers are also lobbying for 
more authority over policy making and increased budget to initiate programs by themselves.  




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 N Y N Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y N Y N N 
2 N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y N N N N N N 
3 N N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y 
4 N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y 
5 N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
5.3.4. Decisionmakers’ Preferences 
The Regulators and the Implementers preferences are shown below in Table 5.13 and Table 5.15. 
As it can be seen below, Regulators prefer occasions in which Option 1 is “N”, meaning that 
they have not got into developing more regulations and standards. They prefer that the 
implementers swiftly conduct programs and initiatives without more time and energy put into 
more policy making.  




5 15 11 18 7 12 1 13 9 17 3 10 6 16 8 2 14 4 
1 N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2 N N N N Y Y N N N N Y Y N N Y N N Y 
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N 
4 N N Y Y N Y N N Y Y N Y N N N N N N 





Descriptions of the above states are discussed in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14 Descriptions of Regulators’ Preferences 
 
State 
Descriptions of Regulators’ Preferences 
5 First priority for Regulators in this conflict is the development of 
auditing initiatives to monitor policy implementation. In other 
words, they want Implementers to just focus on implementing what 
they have been told to do, without them complaining or seeking 
more power and budget.  Overall, the Regulators prefer that Option 
3 (monitoring of the other stakeholders) be selected. This is why 
States 5, 15, 11, 18, 7, and 12 are ranked as the most preferred 
states for the Regulators. 
15 From the Regulators point of view, the Implementers lobbying for 
more budget (Option 5 being selected) is more preferred than them 
seeking an increase in more authority.  
11  In State 11, the Regulators are still monitoring the Implementers, 
however, the Implementers seek more authority over policy making 
and regulation development. 
18 In this state, the Implementers have selected both their options 
(Option 4 and 5 are selected by the Implementers). However, the 
Regulators are only monitoring the Implementers’ performance, 
without getting into approving budget or more authority for the 
Implementers. 
7 From State 7 to State 17, preference prioritization is mostly based 
on the Implementers options. Regulators still prefer to monitor the 
Implementer’s performance and at the same time, they provide the 





renovations, and enhanced drinking water treatment (Option 2 is 
selected). 
12 Here, the Regulator’s decision is the same as State 7 (Option 1 is 
not selected, but Options 2 and 3 are selected). The Implementers 
select Option 4. This state indicates a situation in which monitoring 
is important for Regulators, and at the same time, delegating power 
to the Implementers (Option 5) is not selected. 
1 None of the options are taken by any of the stakeholders. As 
mentioned before, these states are usually transitional states. This 
means that decisionmakers would not be permanently staying in 
them, since they will be transitioning to other states.  
13 In this state, the Implementers have chosen their Option 5, which 
means that they are actively lobbying for more budget. None of the 
other options are taken by the decisionmakers.  
9 The Implementers have chosen their Option 4 in this state, meaning 
that they are actively lobbying for more authority. None of the other 
options are taken by the decisionmakers. 
17 The Implementers have chosen to lobby for both budget and 
authority. 
3 This state is a situation in which the Regulators have provided 
budget for renewing pipelines, sewage systems renovations, and 
enhanced drinking water treatment. None of the other options are 
selected by the decisionmakers.  
10 This state is a combination of Option 2 taken by the Regulators, and 
Option 4 taken by the Implementers. 
6 From State 6 to the end of the preference list, the preferred states 





Generally, choosing Option 1 (approving more authority for the 
Implementers) is the least preferred option for the Regulators. So, 
States 6, 16, 8, 2, 14, and 4 are ranked last in their preference list 
table. Moreover, the Regulators initial preference is to keep 
performance monitoring (Option 3 being selected). Therefore, 
States 6, 16, and 8 are preferred more over States 2, 14, and 4.  
16 In State 16, in addition to Options 1 and 3 being selected by the 
Regulators, Option 5 is selected by the Implementers. 
8 All the first three Options are selected by the Regulators, meaning 
that they have approved more budget, and more authority for the 
Implementers, but at the same time, they continue monitoring their 
performance to ensure they are actively abiding by the standards 
and budget guidelines. 
2 States 2, 14, and 4 are situations in which the Regulators have not 
chosen to monitor the Implementer’s performance (Option 3 not 
selected). In State 2, the Regulators have approved more authority 
for the Implementers, and the Implementers are not lobbying for 
more power or budget.  
14 This state is similar to State 2, however, the Implementers are 
seeking increased budget for further renovations. In this state, the 
Regulators have delegated more authority to the Implementers for 
policy making and developing regulations. This is one of the least 
preferred states in the Regulator’s point of view. 
4 The Regulators least prefer this state. In State 4, the Regulators 
have approved more authority and budget for the Implementers. 






The Implementers initially prefer states in which they are not spending much energy into 
lobbying for more power and budget. In their eyes, this energy can be put on more work on 
programs focused on Lake Erie instead (Table 5.15).  




4 8 10 3 12 7 14 2 16 6 17 13 9 1 18 15 11 5 
1 Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N  N 
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N 
3 N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 
4 N N Y N Y N N N N N Y N Y N Y N Y N 
5 N N N N N N Y N Y N Y Y N N Y Y N N 
 
Descriptions of the above states are discussed in Table 5.16.  
Table 5.16 Descriptions of Implementers’ Preferences 
 
State 
Descriptions of Implementers’ Preferences 
4 Sorting each decisionmakers’ preference is affected by their own 
options and of course, their rival’s options. For example, State 4 
is the most preferred status for Implementers. In this ideal 
situation, the Regulators delegate more power and provide 
budget to Implementers, without enforcing the pressure of 
monitoring them (Option 1 and 2 selected, but Option 3 not 
selected). So, the Implementers are receiving more authority and 
more budget, without putting an effort to lobby for increased 
budget and authority (Options 4 and 5 not selected),  
8 State 8 is less preferred than State 4 for the Implementers. In this 
state, although the regulators have delegated more authority and 
budget to the Implementers, they are monitoring the 





10 The first two preferred states for the Implementers was a 
situation in which both Options 1 and 2 were selected by the 
Regulators. However, after these two states, the Implementers 
prefer to at least be provided with more budget by the 
Regulators, even if they are not provided with more authority to 
set regulations. This is why States 10, 3, 12, and 7 are ranked as 
the next preferred situations for the Implementers. Since the 
Implementers prefer to have more authority as well, they lobby 
for more power as well (Option 4 is selected by them). 
3 The Regulators have provided more budget, and the 
Implementers are happy with this. However, the Implementers 
are not seeking more authority. This state is less preferred than 
State 10.  
12 In this state, the Regulators have taken on monitoring the 
Implementers (Option 3 selected), so the Implementers seek 
authority (Option 4 selected) to balance the Regulators’ power to 
some extent.  
7 In this state, the Implementers will only make the best of the 
additional budget provided by the Regulators.   
14 As mentioned before, the most preferred states from the 
Implementer’s point of view are when the Regulators delegate 
more power, and increase budget at the same time, while the 
Implementers do nothing. This occurs in States 4 and 8. The 
Implementers second set of preferred states is when the 
Regulators choose Option 2, even though they haven’t chosen 
Option 1. This is why States 10, 3, 12 and 7 were ranked after 
States 4 and 8 in the Implementer’s preference list. The third set 
of preferred states for the Implementers is when the Regulators 





regarding managing water systems (States 14, 2, 16 and 6) In 
these States, Option 1 is selected (more power is delegated), but 
not Option 2 (more budget is not provided). Between the four 
states mentioned (14, 2, 16, and 7), States 14 and 2 are more 
preferred since the Regulators are not putting more pressure on 
the Implementers through monitoring them. And finally, State 14 
is more preferred than State 2 for the Implementers, since the 
Implementers prefer to lobby for more budget (Option 5 is 
selected), because the Regulators have not chosen Option 2 
(more budget is not approved).  
2 This state is similar to State 14, however, the Implementers have 
decided to do nothing regarding lobbying for more budget.  
16 The Regulators provide more power to the Implementers (Option 
1 selected), however, they initiate monitoring to control how the 
Implementers perform (Option 3 selected). The budget issue still 
exists for the Implementers, so they prefer to lobby for more 
budget (Option 5 selected) rather than do nothing. 
6 The Regulators decisions are the same as State 16. However, the 
Implementers take no action. 
17 States 17, 13, 9, and 1 are ranked next in the list of preferences, 
and not favorable from the Implementer’s point of view. These 
states indicate situations in which the Regulators take no action 
at all (Options 1, 2 and 3 not selected). Among these states, the 
Implementers first prefer to seek authority and budget at the 
same time (Options 4 and 5 selected) to gain the most control 
over managing water systems 
13 As mentioned before if the Implementers have to select between 





budget. Thus, they select Option 5 (lobby for more budget) in 
State 13. 
9 State 9 is less preferred than State 13, since the Implementers 
solely seek more authority (Option 4 selected) instead of more 
budget (Option 5 selected).  
1 Neither of the decisionmakers take their options. As mentioned 
before, this state is a transitional state, meaning that it is not 
stable.  
18 States 18, 15, 11, and 5 are least preferred states for the 
Implementers. The reason is that the Regulators have not 
delegated more authority and budget to the Implementers 
(Options 1 and 2 not selected), and worse, they are monitoring 
the Implementer’s performance as well (Option 3 selected). This 
puts the highest amount of pressure on the Implementers in 
regards to managing water systems.  In State 18, which is the 
most preferred among the four mentioned states, the 
Implementers are trying their best to get more authority and 
budget from the Regulators (Options 4 and 5 selected).  
15 After State 18, State 15 is preferred. In this state, although the 
Implementers are not lobbying for more power, but they are 
trying to get more budget, as this is more urgent for them.  
11 After State 15, in which the Implementers are seeking more 
budget, State 11 is considered, in which the Implementers try to 
at least receive more power, now that do not have access to more 
budget.  
5 The worst situation in the Implementers’ point of view is to not 
be provided with more power and budget (Options 1 and 2 not 





the Regulators (Option 3 selected), and finally to not seek any 
more power and authority (Option 4 and 5 not selected).  
 
5.3.5. Stability Analysis 
Current case’s equilibrium state (which is rational for all decisionmakers, meaning that everyone 
is stable and cannot unilaterally improve to another state) is shown by “E” in the Tableau Form 
(Fraser and Hipel, 1979; Fraser and Hipel, 1984) (Table 5.17). The remaining states that are 
indicated by “X” represent states that are unstable for at least one decisionmaker. 




X X X E X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Decisionmaker 
Stability 
R R R R U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
5 15 11 18 7 12 1 13 9 17 3 10 6 16 8 2 14 4 
UIs     5 11 5 15 11 18 1 12 5 15 7 1 13 3 
          7 9   6 6 16 8 




R R R S R S R S R S R S S S R U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
4 8 10 3 12 7 14 2 16 6 17 13 9 1 18 15 11 5 
UIs    10  12  14  16  17 17 13  18 18 15 
             9    11 
 
* E: Equilibrium, R: Rational, S: Sequentially sanctioned, U: Unstable for a particular decisionmaker, X: Unstable 






State 18 (N, N, Y, Y, Y) is stable for both the Regulators and the Implementers while the other 
states are stable under some but not all solution concepts. Therefore, State 18 is the equilibrium 
state in this model. 
State 18 is a situation in which the Implementers are seeking authority over policy making and 
regulation development to have more control over what happens in their vicinities. They also try 
to get more budget from the higher-level authorities to become more flexible on their spending 
and water management capabilities. However, the Regulators would not delegate regulating 
power to local governments. The Regulators tend to keep that authority for themselves, so that 
they would be able to maintain power and consistency among their Regions, or Provinces. In 
addition to this, they would develop auditing initiatives to monitor how the local governments 
are implementing the set policies. Moreover, the Regulators would not provide huge amounts of 
budget for the Implementers.  
As mentioned before, State 17 is the status quo of the situation, meaning that it is what is 
currently happening in the real world. State 17 (N, N, N, Y, Y) is very similar to State 18 (N, N, 
N, Y, Y) in that the Regulators are not approving more budget and authority for the 
Implementers, and the Implementers are lobbying for more budget and power over policy 
making. The only difference is the fact that currently monitoring initiatives to audit the 
Implementers’ performance are not heavily conducted in the real world. However, based on the 
GMCR model, and also based on the interviews conducted throughout this research, the system 
is transitioning from State 17 to State 18, in which not only more budget and authority have not 
been approved by the Regulators, but also more monitoring would be conducted on the 
Implementers in the near future (anonymous interviewee #4, personal communication, 2020). An 





5.3.6. Sensitivity Analysis  
Similar to the previously conducted sensitivity analysis on the conflict in 1970s, a modification 
of preferences is conducted here as well, to ensure the robustness of the developed model. This 
validates the obtained results, making sure the model is reasonably built and that the results are a 
reflection of the existing real-world conflict. To test the robustness of the 2010s conflict with an 
even more challenging sensitivity analysis than the one conducted for the 1970s conflict, 
preference ranking of both decisionmakers are modified.  
The modifications assumed for the Regulators preferences are shown in Table 5.18.  
Table 5.18 Regulators Alternative Preferences 
    States 
 
Options 
5 15 11 18 1 13 9 17 7 12 3 10 6 16 8 2 14 4 
1 N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2 N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y N N Y 
3 Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y N N Y Y Y N N N 
4 N N Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y N N N N N N 
5 N Y N Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y N N Y N 
 
It was mentioned in the original model that the Regulators prefer states in which Option 3 is 
selected by them. This was because they intended to make sure that the Implementers are being 
monitored regarding how they are performing. This is why States 5, 15, 11, 18, 7, and 12 were 
ranked first in the preference list (Table 5.13). Also, in that model, it became apparent that the 
Regulators preferred that they don’t approve more authority for the Implementers. This was 
because the Regulators did not want to lose control of managing the system. This was the reason 
that States 6, 16, 8, 8, 2, 14, and 4 were ranked as the least preferred states in the list (Option 1 is 
selected). In the new setting, it is assumed that in addition to avoiding delegating authority, the 





selected). This is why States 7 and 12 moved down the preference list, after States 1, 13, 9, and 
17.  
Modifications regarding the Implementers are shown below in Table 5.19.  




4 8 14 2 16 6 10 3 12 7 17 13 9 1 18 15 11 5 
1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N  N 
2 Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N 
3 N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 
4 N N N N N N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 
5 N N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y N N Y Y N N 
 
In the originally developed model, the Implementers preferred that the Regulators provided them 
with increased budget to renovate infrastructure (Option 2 is selected). Therefore, States 4, 8, 10, 
3, 12, and 7 were ranked as the most preferred states in the Implementer’s perspective. However, 
in the alternative scenario and for the sake of sensitivity analysis, it is assumed that the 
Implementers prefer to be provided with more authority as a most preferred situation (Option 1 is 
selected). Therefore, States 4, 8, 14, 2, 16, and 6 are placed as the most preferred states in the 
Implementer’s preference list.  
Stability analysis resulting from the above alternative model is summarized in the Tableau Form 
(Fraser and Hipel, 1979; Fraser and Hipel, 1984) (Table 5.20). 
As mentioned before, “what-if” questions are asked in sensitivity analyses to test the robustness 
of the model. Different assumptions were made here regarding the preference rankings of the 












X X X E X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Decisionmaker 
Stability 
R R R R U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
5 15 11 18 1 13 9 17 7 12 3 10 6 16 8 2 14 4 
UIs     5 15 11 18 5 11 1 12 5 15 6 1 16 8 
          7 9   7 7 13 3 




R R R S R S R S R S R S U U R U U U 
Preference 
Vector 
4 8 14 2 16 6 10 3 12 7 17 13 9 1 18 15 11 5 
UIs    14  16  10  12  17 13 9  18 15 11 
            17 13   18 15 
 
* E: Equilibrium, R: Rational, S: Sequentially sanctioned, U: Unstable for a particular decisionmaker, X: Unstable 
for at least one decisionmaker 
 
In this alternative scenario, State 18 became stable for both Regulators and Implementers. Since 
the originally developed model resulted in State 18 becoming the equilibrium, and State 18 has 
showed itself as a stable state for all decisionmakers in the alternative model as well, it can be 
concluded that the initial proposed model is robust and reliable.  
5.3.7. Insights from the 1970s External Analysis  
Having gone through the Lake Erie pollution issue through time, it can be seen that many 
internal and external variables have occurred, changing the dynamics of the system. Change of 
dynamics, translates to change of stakeholders, their options, their preferences, and also, the 





foresee these changes, it can try to adapt to them sooner and more effectively, to ensure a better 
status for itself in the future.  
Firstly, it was mentioned previously that after the 1970s, many external changes came into effect, 
which transformed the situation. In section 5.2.7, changes that occurred between 1970s and 
2010s were discussed. Population increase, climate changes, and economic growth were the most 
important occurring variables after the 1970s.  
Secondly, it was shown in the 2010s case analysis that State 18 was the equilibrium state (was 
stable for both local-level governments [Implementers] and high-level governments 
[Regulators]). However, as shown in Table 5.15 (Implementer’s Preference List), State 18 is not 
at all among the most preferred states in the Implementers perspective. In this state, the 
Regulators do not approve more authority and budget for the Implementers, forcing the 
Implementers to put a lot of energy and effort into lobbying for more power and money. 
Moreover, in State 18, the Regulators are monitoring the Implementer’s performance to ensure 
they are acting in accordance with the set regulations.  
With these two introductory points in mind, it can be suggested that if the local governments 
such as Municipalities (Implementers in the 2010s case) had been aware of the external variables 
occurring in the future years after 1970s, they would have been able to actively intervene in the 
dynamics of the disputes to avoid ending up in State 18 in the 2010s. 
The Great Lakes watershed population increase, especially in the Lake Erie region, resulted in 
more used water, more produced sewage, and thus, more required water treatment, in addition to 
more infrastructure construction and maintenance. The responsibility of providing services for 





this was the reason why lobbying for, and receiving more authority and budget from the higher-
level authorities (Regulators), became important options in the 2010s.  
However, assuming that the local governments were aware of this population increase, they 
could have started lobbying for more authority and budget much sooner, when they were hand in 
hand with the higher-level authorities dealing with the pollution concern back in 1970s. As a 
reminder, both local and high-level authorities were on the same side back in 1970s, when all 
investigations resulted in the same results, stating that phosphorous pollution was a serious 
environmental issue, and had to be dealt with as soon as possible. This unanimous agreement on 
the urgency to handle the pollution in 1970s, would have been a great opportunity for the local-
level governments to lobby for more authority and budget, had they known the extra load that 
population would be putting on them in the years to come.  
If the local governments had been delivered the required authority and budget shortly after or 
during the 1970s, the 2010s conflict analysis would have looked differently than it does now. 
With the additional power for regulating the industry, and also, the needed budget to enhance 
water management infrastructure in the region, the local governments would not be seeking more 
budget and authority. Moreover, building on the cooperation developed among the different 
levels of the government in the 1970s, the local governments would have been able to develop 
trust towards themselves, which would have eliminated the need for their performance being 
closely monitored in the 2010s.  
Overall, with the local governments actively participating in trust building initiatives, and also, 
lobbying for more authority and power in the 1970s, after their successful cooperation with the 





4. In this state, which is the most preferred state for the Implementers in 2010s, budget and 
authority for the Implementers would have already been approved (Option 1 and 2 selected). 
Option 3 would not be selected (monitoring of the Implementers would not be felt necessary by 
the Regulators). And Options 4 and 5 would also not be selected by the Implementers since they 
already received the required money and power to regulate the industry as they see fit. All this is 
assuming that the 2010s Options list (Table 5.10) or the main decisionmakers would not have 
changed because of the proposed changed dynamics between the Implementers and Regulators 
after the 1970s.  
A similar line of reasoning can be provided for the other external variable occurring after the 
1970s. Climate change, as an environmental external factor, dramatically increased flooding, 
which in turn increased runoffs of non-treated water pouring into rivers, which then ended up in 
the Great Lakes, including Lake Erie. This increased building up of algae blooms, put more 
pressure on authorities to treat the water before and after use (Williams, 2019). Similarly, other 
environmental factors such as intensified fluctuating temperatures since the 1970s (NOAA - 
CoastWatch, 2020), and recurrent high annual rates of precipitation (NOAA – Great Lakes 
Environmental Research Laboratory, 2020; US Army Corps of Engineers, 2020), increased 
pollution levels in the Great Lakes, putting more strain on the authorities to effectively manage 
water systems.  
Had the local governments anticipated these dramatic climate change effects back in 1970s, they 
would have been able to change the dynamics of the situation, to avoid arriving at State 18 in the 
2010s. An effective strategy by the Implementers to build trust and develop confidence in 
themself, would have been to pioneer climate change awareness initiatives for the Regulators, 





management systems in the years after 1970s. These educational initiatives would have helped 
the Regulators understand the necessity of thoroughly preparing for climate change effects, 
providing more budget for renewing pipelines, sewage systems renovations, and enhanced 
drinking water treatments. And these awareness initiatives taken place by the Implementers 
would have given the Regulators the confidence they required, to not see the need for 
administering additional monitoring and evaluation systems on the Implementers. Therefore, the 
equilibrium state in the 2010s would have again ended up in State 4, which is the most preferred 
state for the Implementers.  
The third and final external factor which was focused on in section 5.2.7, was the Great Lakes 
region’s financial status, showing a high growth rate, faster than the rest of the Canadian 
economy. This successful economy is to the extent that if Great Lakes was considered a country, 
it would have been the third largest economy in the world, after the U.S. and China.  
Predicting this economic growth, the local governments (Implementers in the 2010s) could have 
increased their lobbying efforts and political activities after the successful management of the 
pollution issue in 1970s, to increase their share of the economic prosperity in the coming years. 
Employing this approach after 1970s, would have enabled them to lessen their need for more 
budget in the 2010s.  
In sum, foreseeing external variables after the 1970s, could have helped the Implementers arrive 
at a better position in the 2010s in regards to budget, authority, and trust in their performance.  
5.3.8. Insights from the 2010s External Analysis 
As discussed previously in the methodology section, important external variables affecting the 





investigated in this section. The following scenarios are categorized based on each of the 
PESTLE model variables, however, most of the scenarios include a situation in which two or 
more of the PESTLE variables occur together. To clarify, although a section is devoted to 
political scenarios, many of them enforce an economic shock to the system as well.  
5.3.8.1 Political Atmosphere and Legal Challenges 
Donald Trump, the U.S. President (White House Office of Management and Budget), proposed 
funding cuts (from $300 million a year) to the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI) several 
times during the past few years (Matheny, 2017). This became a source of worry for many 
businesses and NGOs dependent on the funding. However, Congress overruled President 
Trump by giving the program $300 million each year, bringing Congress side-by-side with 
businesses and NGOs supporting the initiative. On the 28th of March 2019, Trump pledged to 
support the total $300 million funding, aligning himself with the other decisionmakers which 
stand for the funding (Skalka, 2019).  
This represents an example of a political variable affecting the stakeholders of the Great 
Lakes. Until March 2019, NGOs and other similar decisionmakers were worried, and had to 
spend millions in lobbying for receiving funding, but then, something positive and out of their 
control happened, which put them in a much better position regarding budgeting. In other 
words, a sudden external political variable, changed the dynamics of the system.  
Focusing on Canada, local municipalities and regions in Ontario, are environmentally concerned. 
Many initiatives are taking place, but as a broader perspective, local governments have 
understood that water conservation initiatives do not only save water, but also save energy and 





requires a lot of energy to be pumped back and forth. And therefore, by conserving water, the 
energy required to treat the used water is also conserved.  
However, the Doug Ford administration (Premier of Ontario; Provincial Government), has 
downplayed the problem with greenhouse gases, and this might become the next serious dispute 
in the system (anonymous interviewee #1, personal communication, 2020). Decreasing funding 
for environmental initiatives in Ontario from 2019, has expanded to different programs in the 
Province. For example, Ontario conservation authorities announced that the Provincial 
government has cut their flood management funding in half (from $7.4 million). This funding is 
used to forecast flooding, issue warnings, monitor stream flow, regulate development activities 
in flood plains, educate the public about flooding and protect natural cover that helps reduce the 
impacts of flooding. 
But as mentioned in previous sections of this thesis, Ontario is experiencing stronger and more 
frequent flood occurrences as a result of recent climate change effects. Conservation Ontario, 
which is a representative of the province’s 36 conservation institutions, which oversee watershed 
management and other ecological matters, said the cuts would impact the region immediately 
(Jones, 2019).  
Some of the other actions by the new provincial administration, other than cutting the flooding 
management funding, are as follows (Xing, 2019):  
• The cap-and-trade program was cut. This initiative capped greenhouse gas emissions, 
however, it allowed polluters to buy or trade exemptions. 
• The office of the environmental commissioner of Ontario was eliminated. 
• Funding to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry was reduced. 





The above actions affect the dynamics of the relationships among the relevant stakeholders. If 
the budget cuts continue, cities and regions would not be able to invest in initiatives to increase 
water conservation, increase society awareness, and decrease non-point source pollution of the 
Great Lakes, especially Lake Erie.  
Another political factor affecting the Great Lakes, is the relationship between US and Canada. 
The disagreements between Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and President Donald Trump on 
topics such as economics and environmental initiatives, might be one of the important political 
aspects one must investigate to understand the potential political changes affecting Great Lakes 
and related ongoing conflicts.  
It was discussed in the previous section on 1970s external analysis that investigating or 
becoming aware of external variables could have helped local-level governments to better 
manage the situation in 1970s towards an enhanced state in the 2010s. Similarly, the 
Implementers can make use of a thorough external analysis in 2010s to improve their position in 
the upcoming potential conflicts in the future. Currently, the Implementers stand at State 18, in 
which they have to put forth a lot of effort on lobbying for more authority and money from the 
higher-level authorities.  
The mentioned political changes in Canada and the US seem to be constantly affecting the local-
level governments dealing with the Great Lakes. Becoming aware of these political external 
variables, local-level governments could actively intervene in the system to change their status 
from State 18, in which they have to rigorously lobby for more authority and budget.  
An action which might be of help to them, is to try to depoliticize climate change in the higher-





political and more scientific in the eyes of the public as a whole, changes in the political 
administrations would have less effects on the stability of policies and funding of water 
management initiatives. To get to this point, the local governments can proactively educate the 
society about climate change, its effects on water management systems, and of course the 
urgency of required funding to lessen its effects on the environment and the society.  
Investigating the legal factor of the PESTLE model, it is understood that the Ontario government 
is trying to persuade farmers to voluntarily reduce fertilizer use on their farms. They are adopting 
new technologies, such as computerized systems and mapping that assist them in using fertilizers 
more efficiently. They are also promoted to change their farming practices such as burying 
fertilizer beside seeds when planting, rather than leaving it on top of the ground, where it might 
be washed away. Although all this is being done voluntarily for most parts, restricting and 
enforcing farmers through new regulations, will have a huge effect on the stakeholders of the 
Lake Erie pollution issue. The costs for the farmers and agricultural businesses would increase, 
leading to their frustration and less cooperation with governmental stakeholders of the conflict 
(anonymous interviewee #1, personal communication, 2020). Having these frustrations in 
perspective when making decisions and regulations, would assist local governments to build trust 
with the agricultural businesses to prevent further conflicts with them in the coming years.  
5.3.8.2. Social and Demographic Trends 
Population growth (birth and immigration) is a major external variable which accounts for 
increases in Lake Erie becoming more polluted with phosphorous. The increase in population in 
Ontario, is highest among all Great Lakes watersheds. Ontario's population is projected to 
increase by 38.0 percent in the next 26 years, from about 14.3 million on July 1, 2018 to about 





be because of migration, and birth accounts for the remaining 18 per cent. The Greater Toronto 
Area (GTA) seems to be the fastest growing region of the province, and shows an increase in 
population from 6.8 million in 2018 to about 10.2 million in 2046 (Government of Ontario, 
2020c). 
Increased population translates into increased sewage, more agricultural land use (deforestation) 
and thus, more loadings from agricultural land, increased water extraction, and in sum, more 
Lake Erie water demand, and less the quality of the water.  
These population growth trends significantly change the dynamics of the system through 
different processes. The budget required to extract, and treat more drinking and sewage water, 
and the money needed to initiate water awareness campaigns for more people, are only some 
examples of the burdens on Cities, and other governmental decisionmakers, who are important 
stakeholders in the current conflict. Regions’ and Cities’ responsibilities over water sourcing for 
more people is a challenge that requires more budget to deal with. However, the increased 
population has put more loads on the whole Province, and thus, the provincial and federal 
governments might also be under pressure, which limits their ability to increase Cities’ budgets. 
This intensifies the already ongoing conflict on budgeting. It can however, strengthen Regions’ 
and Cities’ stances in regards to having more authority over decision making, which is a major 
preference in the investigated conflict, as discussed in the Implementers preference table (Table 
5.15).  
The social factor in the PESTLE model, not only covers population growth and regional 
demographic changes, but also social awareness trends for or against ongoing issues (Aguilar, 





eating more organic food, has been on the rise, and has affected many fast food restaurants. The 
same applies to our conflict. The fact that more people are aware of climate change 
consequences, changes the way they use water in their day to day lives. In line with this trend, 
the effectiveness of the awareness initiatives run by governments and NGOs to protect water 
sources (such as the digital marketing campaign by Canada and Ontario to build awareness of the 
need for actions to reduce phosphorous in the Lake Erie), would be enhanced, and in result of 
this, less budget might be required to implement such initiatives since people are already aware 
of the situation, and thus, require less effort and spending to convince. As seen in Figure 5.8, the 
total water use in Canada declined from 485 litres person per day in 2011, to 427 liters in 2017 
(12% decrease).  
Figure 5.8. Average Daily Total Liters of Water Per Capita in Canada and its Provinces 





Trying to increase awareness in the society in regards to water conservation can be a policy that 
authorities can continue to adopt to resolve concerns regarding regional water scarcity in the 
coming years.  
5.3.8.3. Economic Concerns 
The federal and provincial governments are developing and running programs with multi-million 
dollar commitments to sustain the quality of Lake Erie. Industry decisionmakers are also trying 
to help these initiatives, although, the budget required for these programs is mostly provided by 
the governments.  
As mentioned before, the budget required to run awareness programs, in parallel to additional 
costs from increased treating and maintenance of water sources, and other costs such as 
distribution and floodwater challenges, all impose a huge pressure on the governmental 
institutions. The growing population discussed in the “Social and Demographic Trends” section, 
exacerbates the situation, and the pressure on governmental institutions runs down to businesses, 
NGOs, and the society at large.  
The other demographic trend which should be considered, is the rapidly aging population in 
Canada. By 2030, roughly 25 per cent of Canadian citizens will be seniors, up from 17 per cent 
today. Baby boomers are entering retirement, and these trends will pose a huge financial load on 
the government as benefits to the older generation, “are expected to double in the next ten years 
from $56 billion today (2019) to $99 billion” (Snyder, 2020). This decreases government’s 
spending ability on infrastructural initiatives, which translates to less budget for water 






These additional potential economic pressures on higher-level governments should be 
investigated more in depth. And the local governments could use these investigations’ reports to 
better understand the higher-level authorities’ situation. This insightful understanding can then 
assist the lower-level governments to achieve better deals when negotiating for more authority 
and budget with the higher-level authorities. 
A recession of some magnitude, occurring because of sudden external environments such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic, can also impact the dynamics of the system, as it might slow down or 
completely halt water infrastructure construction projects and other water conservation 
initiatives. This situation is discussed in the upcoming multivariable external shocks section. 
5.3.8.4. Technological Advancements 
The technological advancements factor in the PESTLE, is a double-edged sword in the current 
system. For example, innovations in agricultural technology and fertilizer production after the 
Second World War, allowed the expansion of hybrid corn production and increased application 
of commercial fertilizers (Government of Canada, 2018). This in turn, substantially increased the 
phosphorous amounts pouring into Lake Erie to up to 28,000 tonnes per year in 1968. This might 
well happen in the coming years as well. Other technological breakthroughs in large-scale 
farming might help farmers to be more effective and efficient in their production, however, at the 
end of the day, they might lead to more pollution pouring into Lake Erie, leaving more costs on 
the hands of governmental stakeholders.  
But technological advancements in more effectively and efficiently monitoring phosphorous 
levels, treating water, manufacturing less-phosphorous detergents and fertilizers, more efficient 





harrowing, are only a few of the advancements which help lower phosphorous levels in  Lake 
Erie. New research methods such as digital elevation models created by the LiDAR technology, 
assists Lake Erie stakeholders to decide more informatively on topics such as flood mapping, 
areas of soil erosion risk identification, and precision agriculture (anonymous interviewee #1, 
personal communication, 2020). 
Moreover, people are using far less water, because of all the technological innovations 
happening in home construction, such as low-water-use toilets and plumbing fixtures, appliances, 
and cloth washers (anonymous interviewee #1, personal communication, 2020). 
The other technological variable that might affect the system hugely, is leak detection 
technology. Currently, leakages in the distribution system account for about 17% of the extracted 
water (Statistics Canada, 2019). However, if this is enhanced, it can drastically influence the 
amount of water wasted, and at the end of the day, poured into rivers, as a non-point source, and 
without being treated.  
These technological advancements can be of huge help to the local governments to decrease their 
costs, and to lessen their dependency on more budget from the higher-level authorities. Since 
these technological advances lessen costs for local governments, they can be considered as a 
buffer for the negative economic factors discussed in the previous section as well.  
5.3.8.5. Environmental Issues 
In several spring seasons of the past few years, floodwaters have spilt over western Lake Erie’s 
beaches and ran down on the nearby streets, parking lots, and homes neighbouring the beaches. 
This has been, and is predicted to be, an ongoing issue with all the Great Lakes, as a result of the 





These floodwaters are one of the many consequences of an uncontrollable environmental 
variable, climate change, which is changing the dynamics of Lake Erie’s system. Climate change 
causes higher spring and summer temperatures, and with it, less ice cover, more evaporation, and 
thus, bigger storms, and increasing water levels result. These effects cause serious damages to 
lakefront property owners, recreational boating, and commercial shipping companies. 
Floodwaters also increase costs for Regions and Cities in regards to many service areas such as 
water treatment and distribution (McNeil, 2019).  
Moreover, ice storms might also hugely damage distribution infrastructure all around cities. 
Water main breaks and similar incidents have seen increases in number in the recent years, 
because of ice storms, which have also increased during the recent weather changes (Armenakis 
and Nirupama, 2014).  
Increasing blooms also result in loss of fish and wildlife habitats, which in turn, increases 
invasive species such as white perch, and zebra and quagga mussels, which costs businesses of 
the region, commercial and sport fishing opportunities and natural and cultural heritage. 
Moreover, the increase of these invasive species in Lake Erie, pushes phosphorous closer to the 
shores of Lake Erie, increasing blooms more than ever before. This situation causes clogging at 
water intakes (drinking and industrial), which requires more budget to collect water from water 
resources, and to treat the low-quality collected water (Shin, 2013; TidesCanada, 2015). 
The other environmental shock that could change the current system’s dynamics, is a huge 
contamination of some sort, should it affect the Great Lakes, especially Lake Erie, in enormous 
scale. Another possible shock might be that the regional rivers pouring into any of the Great 





they would require alternative water sources to provide for their residents, and businesses in the 
region (anonymous interviewee #2, personal communication, 2020).  
As mentioned in the insights provided for the 1970s, the local governments can initiate 
awareness and educational initiatives to convince the higher-level authorities that environmental 
changes require attention, and thus, more authority and budget to deal with. 
5.3.8.6. Multivariable External Factor: The Water Efficiency Master Plan 
As mentioned in the previous sections, Canada’s population is growing substantially, not only in 
the bigger cities such as Montreal, Vancouver, and Toronto, but also in medium-sized cities. The 
increase in population, combined with limited resources, triggers many managerial concerns for 
federal, and provincial governments, and regional and local Municipalities. And water, as a 
limited natural resource, has always been one of the central points of discussion among key 
stakeholders such as governments, businesses, NGOs, and the society at large.  
All the aforementioned issues apply to the Region of Waterloo as well, in which the population 
is growing fast, and water sources are limited. Thus, the Region, and Municipalities have been 
focusing their attention on developing more effective water conservation strategies to prevent 
these two variables (population growth, and water limitation), from negatively affecting the 
stakeholders.  
One of the main initiatives which the Region developed, is the Water Efficiency Master Plan 
(WEMP). It was initially approved in 1998, to reduce water consumption by 1.5 million gallons 
per day in 10 years (i.e. by 2009). The WEMP was revised several times to incorporate more 
efficient methods such as a subsidized rain barrel distribution program, a revised Water 





WEMP, has historically achieved significant water savings (up to 42% ahead of the target for 
2011, and exceeding the water consumption goal of the 2015 WEMP). Although these initiatives 
reduce costs, and contribute to the deferral of large water infrastructure projects, the population 
growth has been more than projected, and this necessitates further enhancement to the currently 
planned programs (Gombos, 2014).  
For example, Great Lakes Pipeline construction was proposed as an option to secure water for 
the Region. Lake Erie was proposed as a pipeline source in part because there’s already a water-
taking permit in place that’s enough to provide water for the Waterloo Region and other 
communities. The Ontario government approved the permit in the 1970s, to pipe water from 
Lake Erie to Waterloo Region. However, the Ministry of the Environment mentioned that it will 
reject Lake Huron as a source, to prevent water being extracted from one Great Lakes and 
poured into another. Water extracted from Lake Huron would get used in Waterloo, and then it 
would pour into Lake Erie as wastewater (The Waterloo Record, 2007). This move from one 
lake to the other would violate current treaties (e.g. the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin 
Water Resources Compact) (Saeger, 2007).  
Regional government discussed pipeline construction from Great Lakes to be initiated by 2035, 
when the population would grow beyond 729,000 people. Environmentalists oppose a pipeline at 
any time or at any cost. They try to advertise focusing instead on conservation and groundwater 
protection (The Waterloo Record, 2007).  
However, given the significant cost of this project as a large capital project, the government 
preferred to focus on other low-cost methods such as water conservation measures, education 





deferred the pipeline project to 2051, and it claims that this saves amounts reaching up to 100 
million dollars for the taxpayers and around 77,000 tons of CO2 emissions. Of course, this is 
conditioned on water consumption averages decreasing from around 200 liters, to about 170 
liters per capita per day (Gombos, 2014).  
The program will ensure that the Region of Waterloo continues to be an innovative leader in 
water efficiency. The current water efficiency program is broad and comprehensive, and has 
already achieved deep market penetration in several areas because of its maturity – notably with 
low-water toilet rebates and rainwater barrel sales. There is a need now to put forward creative 
and innovative programming to reach beyond the “low hanging fruit” (Gombos, 2014). 
All said, the Water Efficiency Master Plan (WEMP) is a variable which does not only fit in the 
Political and Legal category of the PESTLE model, but can also be investigated as a 
technological, economic, and environmental factor, which affects all stakeholders including 
local, provincial, and federal governments in both US and Canada, businesses, NGOs, and the 
society as a whole. This plan hugely affects the dynamics of the Lake Erie system, and thus, the 








Chapter 6 Conclusions: Summary, Contributions, 
Limitations, and Future Research 
6.1. Summary  
This study is an attempt to better understand the relationships among water resource stakeholders 
which are directly or indirectly affected by the Great Lakes. Each of these stakeholders have 
different preferences and options they can choose from, and this brings about disputes and 
conflicts which can become serious and complicated in some cases. This study presents methods 
and a framework that can be used to avoid or to mitigate the impacts of future conflicts. Toward 
this purpose, the following steps are taken in this thesis. 
Initially, an introduction to the various stakeholders of the Great Lakes was provided. 
Decisionmakers such as different governmental levels, various businesses, NGOs, and 
communities surrounding Great Lakes and their stakes in the Great Lakes water management 
system, as a globally unique fresh-water resource, were investigated. Then, the different types of 
potential conflicts among these stakeholders were discussed.  
Some of this information was extracted from interviews with knowledgeable individuals 
currently or previously working in one or more of the involved stakeholders / institutions. This 
step carried its own challenges regarding finding, and setting meetings with, insightful 
individuals in different associations relevant to the Great Lakes. The other information pieces 
were gathered through relevant media articles, journal papers, website pages, documentaries, and 
other secondary sources. All of these enhanced our understanding of the stakeholders, their 





In the next step, in the knowledge gap section of the 2nd Chapter, the need of a holistic view to 
resolving the Great Lakes’ complex conflicts was discussed. It is only with a holistic perspective 
that the complex interrelated conflicts and also the various uncontrollable external variables 
could be studied in one single, interdependent (and somewhat simplified) system.  
In the next chapter (Chapter 3), the methodology phases of this thesis are laid out in more detail. 
Causal loops, GMCR, external and scenario analysis, are the main introduced methods combined 
and used for achieving the aforementioned holistic perspective. Causal loops diagrams provide a 
visual and analytical view of the interactions among all the relevant variables affecting the Great 
Lakes water management system. And the GMCR, helps us in thoroughly investigating conflicts 
among the involved stakeholders. Finally, external and scenario analysis, shed light on the 
uncontrollable shocking factors affecting the stakeholders’ options and their actions’ 
consequences. The methodology section concluded with a detailed description of the data 
collection processes conducted in this thesis.  
Chapter 4 focused on two disputes as case studies to showcase a few of the complex and 
interrelated conflicts among the discussed stakeholders in more detail. For example, powerful 
and ambitious water bottling companies, and other heavy water consumers, seek more access to 
the Great Lakes water sources, increasing the rate of exhaustion of the Great Lakes. But multiple 
adjoining states and provinces, and a number of NGOs which initiate various events, 
conferences, and other initiatives, are factors in opposition with the previously mentioned 
stakeholders. These Protectors as we called them, try to protect the water source from threatening 
water extractions. The different options and preferences of these opposing decisionmakers, 
causes a dynamic system in which each of their actions, affects the other decisionmaker’s status, 





mathematical analysis of the cases, an equilibrium state is identified. This state introduces a 
situation in which both decisionmakers stop moving. 
Chapter 5 investigates another complex case. The reason this case was focused on was that it has 
been an ongoing conflict among the stakeholders for decades. And thus, linking them from 
different time periods (to discuss the aforementioned holistic perspective) could be showcased 
better. In Chapter 5, the condition of rising phosphorous levels in Lake Erie was studied in two 
different times, the 1970s and also 2010s. As was seen in the results, not only were the 
stakeholders different in these two times, but their successors’ options and preferences changed 
during the 40-50-year period in between.  
In the first insight section of the 5th Chapter (section 5.3.7), it was discussed that if the local-level 
governments were aware of the external variables occurring after 1970s, they would have been 
able to adapt to the situation sooner, and in a more effective manner, which would have enabled 
them to end up in a more preferred position in 2010s. Similarly, in Section 5.3.8, the external 
variables in 2010s are focused on, suggesting that the authorities can enhance their position in 
the future, through investigating these variables and adapting to the changing system dynamics.  
In sum, the vitality of the Great Lakes ecosystem to various Canadian and U.S. stakeholders, and 
the threats that have loomed over the sustainability of this essential environmental asset, 
necessitate considerable efforts, such as this thesis, to map and to mitigate or resolve the 
numerous complicated conflicts among the involved stakeholders. 
6.2. Contributions  
The analyzed cases in this thesis are only the tip of the iceberg of existing disagreements among 





Review (Chapter 2) of this thesis, these conflicts range from water extraction disputes (e.g. 
between Waukesha City and Other Municipalities, or between Nestle and City of Guelph), to 
water distribution and water treatment disagreements (Lake Erie pollution concerns). Other 
potential disputes, in addition to shocks due to uncontrollable external variables that might occur, 
further complicate the conflict resolution process. Therefore, comprehensive research on the 
complex multiphase disputes among the stakeholders must be conducted to understand the 
conflicts with a broader perspective and in one framework instead of investigating them as 
separate independent instances.  
This is the reason that in this thesis, the past, present, and future of conflicts were investigated, 
instead of only focusing on one time period. Initially, the causal loop, the GMCR method, and 
external analysis were applied to the Lake Erie pollution conflict in the 1970s. This first step 
served as a background investigation for the main conflict analysis period, which was the 2010s. 
The GMCR of 2010s was based on results from the previous conflict analysis implemented for 
1970s. Moreover, the future of the conflict was investigated through external analysis which 
depicted the many potential futures for the involved stakeholders. 
The holistic framework presented in this thesis can help the relevant stakeholders understand and 
mitigate the interrelated and successive conflicts that occur over water resources in the Great 
Lakes and the rivers flowing into them. For example, as mentioned in Section 2.4.7 (Regional 
and Local Water Utilities’ Fragile Position in Conflicts), water utility providers carry a huge 
responsibility towards millions of water users. The framework proposed here can especially help 
these water utility providers to predict, and better yet, to prevent potential water disputes with 
other stakeholders. This could save money and time for not only the utility providers, but also 





other potential complications in their relations among each other. It can also improve quality of 
life for the people living in the Great Lakes region through increasing collaboration among the 
main decisionmakers in the Great Lakes water management system.  
6.3. Limitations and Challenges 
6.3.1. Anonymity in the Interview Process  
Similar to any other research project, this thesis has also undergone many challenges. Although 
many of these challenges were successfully dealt with when conducting the research, some other 
were structural limitations stemming from the nature of this thesis topic.  
For example, this thesis focuses on conflict among water management systems stakeholders. And 
not surprisingly, when initiating and conducting the interviews, some of the interviewees had 
concerns about their identities being known publicly throughout and after the research took 
place. An extra effort had to be employed to ensure the interviewees and the UW ethics office, 
about the anonymity of the interview process. Throughout the interviews, sensitive topics were 
avoided by some of the interviewees. For example, questions about disputes between Regions 
and Municipalities were approached with caution by some interviewees, even though a thorough 
process had taken place to keep their identities undisclosed. Preventing discussion of certain 
topics in depth, has most certainly affected the quality of the current research, since some aspects 
of the system dynamics might have been missed due to the interviewees’ concerns about 
anonymity.    
6.3.2. Corona Virus Challenges 
Another obstacle in the face of conducting this research, was the occurrence of the Corona 





University campuses and many other governmental and businesses closed their physical 
locations, and almost all activities were forced to be done remotely through online channels. This 
put a huge restriction regarding networking initiatives for finding potential interviewees, and 
also, research which could have been conducted at these institutions’ libraries or offices. A 
number of interviews were also cancelled due to the additional workload imposed on the 
interviewees, and the fact that they became too busy with their other commitments during this 
transition to working remotely. 
6.3.3. Subjectivity in Model Development  
As discussed previously, identifying and sorting the feasible states in a proposed Graph Model is 
a complicated and to some extent, a subjective procedure based on the opinions and judgments of 
the researcher and the sources used in the data collection phase of the research. To overcome this 
concern, sources with different perspectives were chosen to provide an unbiased view of the 
conflicts in interest. Moreover, as mentioned in the Methodology section of the thesis (Chapter 
3), the interviewees who were invited to participate, were selected from different backgrounds 
and institutions, which represented multiple conflict stakeholders. This ensured different 
perspectives to be considered when developing causal loops, GMCR models, and analyzing 
external variables in the environment.  
6.4. Future Research 
6.4.1. Achieving More Objectivity 
In hopes of achieving more objectiveness in the Graph Model development process, the various 
Great Lakes conflicts should be investigated by other authors as well. Comparing the results 
obtained on all of the conducted studies enhances our understanding of the effects each author’s 





6.4.2. Perceptual Graph Model 
The Graph Model analysis is an effective technique to investigate complex conflicts and their 
decisionmakers’ options and preferences. However, this approach does not take into account the 
perceptions these decisionmakers have towards each other.  
Emotions and perceptions towards the other stakeholders (either positive or negative) have the 
potential to transform feasible states to infeasible states or vice versa. Thus, some states might be 
added or removed from the analysis because of these perceptions among the stakeholders. As an 
exaggerated example, in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the existing anger and prejudice among the 
involved decisionmakers eliminates the prospect of peaceful resolutions, triggering aggressive 
attitudes. In other words, because of their emotions toward each other, some states are hidden in 
their perspectives. The Perceptual Graph Model method has been introduced in the literature to 
fill this gap (Obeidi, Hipel, & Kilgour, 2005). 
In Perceptual Graph Models, unique stability analyses for each of the decisionmakers are 
conducted. And through a complex mathematical approach, these inconsistent perspectives of the 
decisionmakers towards each other, are combined into one single analysis. The Perceptual Graph 
Model technique provides both individual and overall stability analyses. Therefore, the final 
stable equilibria states are investigated under more solution concepts and perspectives, and thus, 
are more robust since they represent a broader range of stability in different situations and from 
different viewpoints. 
It is recommended that in the future studies on Great Lakes disputes, the Perceptual Graph 
Model technique be also used. Through this approach, emotions that might have been developed 





and also in providing resolutions for these disputes. This method can also contribute to studying 
the conflicts in an interrelated manner, linking together the stakeholders and their conflicts in 
time, and in different fields of disagreement.   
6.4.3. Thematic Analysis  
A common method used to analyze qualitative material such as interviews is thematic analysis. 
This method focuses on identifying and analyzing meaningful patterns within the gathered 
qualitative data. The primary and secondary data collected in the research data gathering phase, 
are coded into different categories, and then, into broader themes. These themes are then 
combined into models through theoretical interpretations.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the COVID-19 pandemic prevented more interviews to 
take place in this project. However, more interviews with previous and current representatives of 
all the relevant decisionmakers in the disputes, will help this research to become less biased, and 
more thorough. And analyzing all these interviews using other effective qualitative methods such 
as thematic analysis, can provide in-depth insight, and enhance our understanding of the 
dynamics of the water management system.  
6.4.4. Corona Virus as a Multivariable External Factor 
An external variable, which has taken place in the latter phases of conducting this research, is the 
pandemic of COVID-19, namely, Coronavirus. The Virus single-handedly changed the face of 
the world. Within weeks of its appearance, the pandemic closed public schools, universities, and 
many governmental institutions, such as Regions and Municipalities, to encourage social 





The whole pandemic started back in December 2019 from a wild animal local market in Wuhan, 
a city in China. After a few months (February 2020), the Virus was all over the globe, infecting 
more than 55.6 million people, with more than 1.34 million deaths to date (20th of November 
2020). In Canada, the Virus has infected 316,000 people, with 11,265 deaths up until now (20th 
of November 2020). These numbers still growing, forced many countries, including Canada, to 
announce multiple differently structured quarantines in the country, enforcing people to stay 
inside (Jackson and Connolly, 2020). 
From the confirmation of the first case in Waterloo Region on 5th of March 2020 (Nielsen, 
2020a), there has been many closures or drastic changes of schedules in many governmental 
operations, from airports, provincial offences courts, recreation facilities, libraries, museums, and 
child cares, to City facilities, and water efficiency programs such as rain barrel distribution 
programs, or leakage auditing initiatives. Budgeting, infrastructure development, revenue 
generation, operations management, and almost all components of governmental institutions at 
all levels, have and will face changes, in light of this uncontrollable external variable (Nielsen, 
2020b).  
Governments have reallocated their budgets to initiatives protecting businesses which are 
vulnerable to being damaged by the pandemic. Moreover, only in Ontario, $3.3 billion was put 
aside to support frontline health care workers and to increase hospital capacity, including $2.1 
billion in new and urgent funding to combat and contain the spread of COVID-19. With this new 
funding, Ontario added 1,000 acute care and 500 critical care beds. Ontario also announced 
possible partnerships with hotels to free up beds in hospitals and 72 COVID-19 assessment 
centres opened across the province to help with this fight against the Virus (Government of 





Lakes’ stakeholders including, but not limited to, businesses, different levels of the government, 
NGOs, and the society as a whole.  
The pandemic, as an external variable, has also affected water usage, and wastewater level 
patterns, which in turn, influences local, regional, provincial, and federal governments. 
Municipalities’ revenue levels have been affected as well (Government of Ontario, 2020d).  
All said, the pandemic has yet to unfold the vast influences it has started to put on different 
industries, institutions, and the society as a whole. A lot of research has to be dedicated to 
understanding how the spread of COVID19 has affected the world in political, economic, social, 
technological, legal, and environmental categories. Local governments have to proactively 
investigate the drastic changes this pandemic has caused in their regions’ water management 
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Appendix A Interview Forms 
Appendix A.1. Consent Form 
By signing this consent form, you are not waiving your legal rights or releasing the investigator(s) or 
involved institution(s) from their legal and professional responsibilities.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by 
Professors Carl T. Haas, and Mark Knight, and PhD student, Sevda Payganeh of the Department of 
Civil and Environment Engineering at the University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask any 
questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any additional details 
I wanted. 
I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be audio recorded to ensure an accurate 
recording of my responses.   
I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the thesis and/or publications to 
come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be anonymous.  
I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher. I 
am also aware that it is not possible to withdraw the interview data, after papers have been submitted. 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research 
Ethics Committee (ORE#41121). If you have questions for the Committee contact the Office of Research 
Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.  
 
For all other questions contact Sevda Payganeh at spaygane@uwaterloo.ca ,Carl Haas (Faculty 
Supervisor;  PhD, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Waterloo) at 1-519-888-4567 x35492 or 
chaas@uwaterloo.ca, or Mark Knight (Faculty Supervisor;  PhD, Civil and Environmental Engineering, 
University of Waterloo) at 1-519-888-4567 x36919 or mark.knight@uwaterloo.ca. 
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study. 
YES   NO   
I agree to have my interview audio recorded. 
YES   NO   
I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of this research. 






Participant Name: ____________________________ (Please print)   
Participant Signature: ____________________________  
Witness Name: ________________________________ (Please print) 









Appendix A. 2. Information Letter 
Title of the study: Great Lakes Regional Water Conflicts Analysis 
 
Faculty Supervisor: Carl Haas, PhD, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Waterloo. 
Phone: 1-519-888-4567 x35492, Email: chaas@uwaterloo.ca 
 
Faculty Supervisor: Mark Knight, PhD, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of 
Waterloo. Phone: 1-519-888-4567 x 36919, Email: mark.knight@uwaterloo.ca  
 
Student Investigator: Sevda Payganeh, MSc, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of 
Waterloo. Email: spaygane@uwaterloo.ca  
 
To help you make an informed decision regarding your participation, this letter will explain what the 
study is about, the possible risks and benefits, and your rights as a research participant. If you do not 
understand something in the letter, please ask one of the investigators prior to consenting to the 
study. You will be provided with a copy of the information and consent form if you choose to 
participate in the study. 
 
What is the study about? 
You are invited to participate in a research study about government institutions, businesses, NGOs 
and other stakeholders relevant to the Great Lakes water resources. More specifically, the 
purpose of the study is to find out what each of these stakeholders think about the Region of 
Waterloo Water Efficiency Masterplan Program (WEMP). Does the Masterplan fulfill their 
preferences? How are each of these stakeholders affected by the Masterplan? And what can be 
done to provide better options for each decisionmaker? 
 
This study is being undertaken as part of my (Sevda Payganeh) PhD research.  
 
I. Your responsibilities as a participant  
What does participation involve? 
Participation in the study will consist of participating in an interview (face-to-face or online through 
video-chat, based on your preference). The session is expected to last 60-90 minutes. A light snack and 
refreshments will be provided. The interview will be held in an office at the University of Waterloo, 
or at a place of your choosing, at a time and date convenient for you. I will guide a discussion on 
Great Lakes Water Management Systems, especially the question of Region of Waterloo Water 
Efficiency Masterplan Program (WEMP) stakeholders’ preferences and options. The types of 
questions that I will ask include: Who might the Water Efficiency Masterplan Program (WEMP) 
affect? What benefits and risks does it bring to the different stakeholders? 
 
With your permission, the session will be audio-recorded to ensure an accurate transcript of the 





presentations.  You will have the option of going through the transcript after the interview has 
been transcribed.  
 
Who may participate in the study? 
Individuals who are informed about the Great Lakes, especially Lake Erie, and the Region of 
Waterloo Water Efficiency Masterplan Program (WEMP), are potential interviewees of the 
current study. 
 
II. Your rights as a participant 
Is participation in the study voluntary? 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may decide to leave the study at any time by 
communicating this to the interviewer. Any information you provided up to that point will not be used. 
You may decline to answer any question(s) you prefer not to answer. You will also have the option of 
going through the interview transcript after the interview has been transcribed. You can request 
your data be removed from the study up until February 2020 as it is not possible to withdraw you data 
once my thesis has been submitted. 
 
What are the possible benefits of the study? 
Participation in this study may not provide any personal benefit to you. I hope the data from the 
interview increases our understanding of the Great Lakes and their stakeholders relationships. 
 
What are the risks associated with the study? 
Please be aware that should you decide to participate in an online interview, information is 
transmitted over the internet and thus, privacy cannot be guaranteed. There is always a risk your 
responses may be intercepted by a third party (e.g., government agencies, hackers). University of 
Waterloo researchers will not collect or use internet protocol (IP) addresses or other information 
which could link your participation to your computer or  electronic device without first 
informing you. 
 
Other than this, there are no known or anticipated risks associated with participation in this study. If a 
question, or the discussion, makes you uncomfortable, you can choose not to answer. See above for 
more details on voluntary participation. 
 
Will my information be kept confidential? 
Your identity will be kept confidential. Identifying information will be removed from the 
transcripts and the audio recordings will be deleted after I defend my thesis (expected to be summer 
2020). The transcripts and other electronic data will be retained for a minimum of 7 years, after which 
they will be destroyed. Data will be stored in an encrypted folder on my password protected laptop. 





my thesis or any presentations or publications based on this research.  
 
Once all the data are collected and analyzed for this project, I plan on sharing this information 
(without identifying anyone in particular) with the research community through seminars, 
conferences, presentations, and journal articles.  If you are interested in receiving more 
information regarding the results of this study, or would like a summary of the results, please 
provide your email address, and when the study is completed, anticipated by May 2020, I will 
send you the information. 
 
Questions, comments, or concerns  
Has the study received ethics clearance? 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research 
Ethics Committee (ORE# 41121). If you have questions for the Committee contact the Office of Research 
Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca. 
 
Who should I contact if I have questions regarding my participation in the study? 
For all other questions contact Sevda Payganeh at spaygane@uwaterloo.ca ,Carl Haas (Faculty 
Supervisor;  PhD, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Waterloo) at 1-519-888-4567 
x35492 or chaas@uwaterloo.ca, or Mark Knight (Faculty Supervisor;  PhD, Civil and 











Appendix A.3. Recruitment Email 
 
Hello, 
My name is Sevda Payganeh, and I am a PhD student working under the supervisions of 
Professor Carl Haas, and Professor Knight in the Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Department at the University of Waterloo.   
You were introduced by my supervisors to take part in a University of Waterloo research study 
to gain information on Great Lakes, especially the Region of Waterloo Water Efficiency Master 
Plan (WEMP), as we are conducting a study that investigates how this plan is affecting the 
relevant stakeholders.  
Participation in this study involves a 60-90 minute face-to-face (in-person or Skype) interview 
which discusses the topic more in detail. I would like to assure you that the study has been 
reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics 
Committee. 
However, the final decision about participation is yours. 






If you are interested in participating, please contact me at spaygane@uwaterloo.ca and list your 
top three choices for when you would like to participate from the list above. Please also state 
you preferred method of interview (in-person or Skype or other video-chat platforms). 
 
Sincerely, 








Appendix A.4. Appreciation Email  
 
University of Waterloo 
Date 
Dear (Name of Participant), 
I would like to thank you for your participation in this study entitled Great Lakes Regional Water Conflicts 
Analysis. The data collected during interviews will contribute to a better understanding of the Region of 
Waterloo’s Water Efficiency Master Plan (WEMP) and its relevant stakeholders.  
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research 
Ethics Committee (ORE#41121). If you have questions for the Committee contact the Office of Research 
Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.  
 
For all other questions contact Sevda Payganeh at spaygane@uwaterloo.ca ,Carl Haas (Faculty 
Supervisor;  PhD, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Waterloo) at 1-519-888-4567 x35492 or 
chaas@uwaterloo.ca, or Mark Knight (Faculty Supervisor;  PhD, Civil and Environmental Engineering, 
University of Waterloo) at 1-519-888-4567 x36919 or mark.knight@uwaterloo.ca. 
 
Please remember that any data pertaining to you as an individual participant will be kept confidential.  
Once all the data are collected and analyzed for this project, I plan on sharing this information with the 
research community through seminars, conferences, presentations, and journal articles.  If you are 
interested in receiving more information regarding the results of this study, or would like a summary of the 
results, please provide your email address, and when the study is completed, anticipated by May 2020, I 
will send you the information. In the meantime, if you have any questions about the study, please do not 
hesitate to contact me by email or telephone as noted below.  
Sevda Payganeh 










Appendix B: Surveys 
To understand the ongoing and potential conflicts among water management related 
stakeholders, a survey has been developed and will be sent to a number of professionals, and 
involved decisionmakers in the water management system. These include, but are not limited to 
the executives and employees of municipalities, heavy water consumers, and NGOs. 
These surveys help us better understand these decisionmakers’ perceptions of the industry, and 
identify and monitor major external trends which affect different sectors of the system. Overall, 
responses to the below questionnaire will shed light on the challenges facing each decisionmaker 
and thus, significantly increase our ability to investigate different scenarios, and propose win-win 
solutions for the current and possible future disputes.  
Thesis Project Interview Questions – Sevda Payganeh 
Questions on Waterloo Masterplan Stakeholders and the Conflicts Among them: 
- Who might the Water Efficiency Masterplan Program (WEMP) affect? What benefits and risks 
does it bring to the different stakeholders?  
- Could you discuss the dynamics among the stakeholders of the WEMP? Which of them have 
constructive relationships, and how do you think their relationships might change in the future? 
- The official reports that are widely available, are written by the region or other governmental 
institutions, and mostly discuss the WEMP’s benefits for all stakeholders. Risks and possible 
disadvantages have not been mentioned that much. Where else can we get access to other 
perspectives regarding the plan? 
- The recommended activities for between 2015 and 2025, cost about 1 million CAD annually, 
but where does the budget come from? Answer: Taxpayer’s pockets! Will this cause cold feet in 
the community to support WEMP? But then, the pipeline will also cost 100 million dollars with a 
budget from the taxpayers. Which of these two options more directly affect taxpayers?  
- Does the WEMP put businesses under pressure to adapt to tighter and more costly regulations 
and standards? What can they do (and to whom should they) voice their concerns to, over these 
increased pressures? 
- During the process of the WEMP being developed, was any department from the Region, not 
consent with the way the data for the report was being collected and analyzed?  






Questions on Waterloo Masterplan Scenario Analysis: 
- What occurrences might drastically affect the current stable state among the stakeholders in the 
Waterloo Masterplan conflict? These occurrences can be in categories such as political, 
environmental, economic, social, technological, and legal. 
- How do any of these variables affect the relationships the stakeholders have with each other?  
Interview Points: 
- Where can we find individuals or institutions which are not satisfied with the WEMP? And can 







Appendix C: GMCRII Screenshots (Case I) 
Note: All the below screenshots have been developed using the GMCRII decision support 
system (Fang et al., 2003a; Fang et al., 2003b; Hipel et al., 1997). 
Note: In the below tables, “Y” is when the option is selected by the decisionmaker, and “N” is 
when the option is not selected by the decisionmaker. 
Appendix C.1. Decisionmakers and their Options 
 






























































Appendix D GMCRII Screenshots (1970s) 
Note: All the below screenshots have been developed using the GMCRII decision support 
system (Fang et al., 2003a; Fang et al., 2003b; Hipel et al., 1997). 
Note: In the below tables, “Y” is when the option is selected by the decisionmaker, and “N” is 
when the option is not selected by the decisionmaker.  






Appendix D.2. Determining Feasible States  
 






Appendix D.4. State Ranking (Preferences) for Businesses  
 






Appendix D.6 State Ranking (Preferences) for Authorities (Sensitivity Analysis) 
 






Appendix E GMCRII Screenshots (2010s) 
Note: All the below screenshots have been developed using the GMCRII decision support 
system (Fang et al., 2003a; Fang et al., 2003b; Hipel et al., 1997). 
Note: In the below tables, “Y” is when the option is selected by the decisionmaker, and “N” is 
when the option is not selected by the decisionmaker. 






Appendix E.2. Determining Feasible States (Eliminating Infeasible States) 
 















































Appendix E.9. Equilibria (Stable State(s)) (Sensitivity Analysis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
